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Abstract
This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bring-
ing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general-interest
reader. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral
hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical ndings. We make
two broad points. First, traditional theories nd it di¢ cult to explain the data, suggest-
ing that compensation results from rent extractionby CEOs. However, more modern
shareholder valuetheories that arguably better capture the CEO setting do deliver pre-
dictions consistent with observed practices, suggesting that these practices need not be
ine¢ cient. Second, seemingly innocuous features of the modeling setup, often made for
tractability or convenience, can lead to signicant di¤erences in the models implications
and conclusions on the e¢ ciency of observed practices. We close by highlighting appar-
ent ine¢ ciencies in executive compensation and additional directions for future research.
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1. Introduction
There is considerable debate on executive compensation in both the public arena and academia.
This debate spans several important topics in economics, such as contract theory, corporate
nance, corporate governance, labor economics, and income inequality. One side is the rent
extractionview, which claims that current compensation practices sharply contrast the pre-
dictions of traditional agency models. Thus, contracts are not chosen by boards to maximize
shareholder value, but instead by the executives themselves to maximize their own rents. This
perspective, espoused most prominently by Bebchuk and Fried (2004), has been taken very
seriously by both scholars and policymakers, and led to major regulatory changes. In the U.S.,
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandated increased disclosure of compen-
sation in 2006, and say-on-pay legislation was passed as part of Dodd-Frank in 2010. In 2013,
the European Union imposed caps on bankersbonuses, the SEC mandated disclosure of the
ratio of Chief Executive O¢ cer (CEO) pay to median employee pay, and Switzerland held
an ultimately unsuccessful referendum to limit CEO pay to twelve times the pay of the lowest
worker.
The more modern shareholder valueview reaches a di¤erent conclusion. While it acknowl-
edges that elementary agency models are inconsistent with practice, it argues that such models
do not capture the specics of the CEO setting, since they were created as frameworks for the
principal-agent problem in general. For example, CEOs have a very large e¤ect on rm value
compared to rank-and-le employees. Thus, in a competitive labor market, it may be optimal
to pay high wages to attract talented CEOs, and implement high e¤ort from them even though
doing so requires paying a premium.1 Newer models aim to capture the specics of the CEO
employment relationship, and can indeed generate predictions consistent with the data. Under
this perspective, regulation will do more harm than good.
The shareholder valueview broadens what is commonly referred to as the optimal con-
tractingview, which typically focuses on the details of bilateral contracts. We use the term
shareholder value for two main reasons. First, it emphasizes the need to take into account
additional dimensions such as market forces and competitive equilibrium. Second, in reality
boards are unlikely to choose the perfectly optimal contract, even if they are concerned with
shareholder value rather than rent extraction. One potential reason is a preference for simplic-
ity, which may restrict them to piecewise linear contracts. The theoretically optimal contract is
typically highly nonlinear and so never observed in reality; under a strict denition of optimal
contracting, this view would be immediately rejected. A second is bounded rationality, which
may lead to boards not being aware of certain (potentially non-obvious) performance measures
that could theoretically improve the contract if included.
This article critically assesses the rent extraction vs. shareholder value debate, by analyzing
1A simple model can justify high CEO pay simply by assuming a high level for the reservation utility, which
is an exogenous parameter. Modern assignment models endogenize the reservation utility.
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newer models of executive compensation and evaluating the extent to which they can explain
observed practices. In particular, while recent theories have used di¤erent frameworks and
focused on di¤erent dimensions of the contracting problem, we present a tractable unifying
model to bring together the conclusions of this large literature, starting with classic theories
and then moving to modern ones. In Section 2 we begin by analyzing the determinants of
the level of pay, starting with neoclassical production models of the rm and then moving
to modern assignment models. These assignment models yields empirical predictions for how
CEO pay varies cross-sectionally between rms of di¤erent sizes, and over time as the size of
the average rm in the economy changes.
Having determined the level of pay, we then move to incentives. In Section 3 we consider a
static moral hazard model where the CEO takes an action that improves expected rm value,
starting in Section 3.1 with the risk-neutral case and moving to risk aversion in Section 3.3.
While this setting appears quite standard, we will show that seemingly innocuous features of
the modeling setup, often made for convenience or tractability (e.g. the choice between additive
or multiplicative utility and production functions, and binary or continuous actions) can lead
to signicant di¤erences in the models implications  and thus conclusions as to whether
observed practices are consistent with theory. In particular, newer multiplicative models are
able to explain some stylized facts (such as the relationship between incentives and rm size)
that traditional additive models cannot. We also discuss various frameworks that researchers
can use to yield tractable solutions to the contracting problem, and the appropriate empirical
measure of incentives. Section 3.4 embeds the moral hazard model into a market equilibrium
to generate additional empirical implications, and Section 3.5 discusses the evidence. Section
3.6 considers the case of multiple signals. In contrast to the Holmstrom (1979) informativeness
principle, in many rms the CEOs pay depends on industry shocks outside his control, which
Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue is strong evidence that contracting is suboptimal. We show
that the theory does not unambiguously predict that industry shocks should be ltered out,
due to other considerations in a CEO setting that are absent from Holmstrom (1979). Section
3.7 allows the CEO to a¤ect the volatility as well as mean of rm value, by choosing the rms
risk. It discusses how options can encourage goodrisk-taking, and debt-based compensation
can deter badrisk-shifting if the rm is levered.
Section 4 moves to a multi-period model. A dynamic setting poses several challenges absent
from standard single-period models: contracts that are initially optimal may lose their incentive
e¤ect over time, the CEO can take myopic actions that boost short-term returns at the expense
of long-run value, and he may undo the contract by private saving. In addition to these
complications, a dynamic setting provides the principal with additional opportunities: she can
provide incentives through the threat of termination, and base the CEOs pay on returns in
previous as well as current periods.
Each section will compare the empirical predictions of the theories with the evidence.
Broadly speaking, we will argue that many, but not all, features of observed contracts that are
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frequently criticized are actually consistent with e¢ ciency, particularly when studying more
modern theories. However, empirical correlations cannot be interpreted as denitive proof of
the shareholder value view, given the di¢ culties in identifying causality. Section 5 highlights
apparent ine¢ ciencies in executive compensation, as well as open questions for future research.
Section 6 concludes.
This article aims to di¤er from existing surveys of executive compensation. Core, Guay, and
Larcker (2003) and Frydman and Jenter (2010) focus largely on the empirical evidence. Mur-
phy (2013) provides a historical perspective and discusses the role of institutional constraints.
Edmans and Gabaix (2009) focus exclusively on recent theories and use verbal descriptions
rather than a formal model. Our main contribution is to study both traditional and modern
contracting theories, with a particular attention to the role of modeling choices, and combine
their ndings into a single unifying framework. As with any survey, we are forced to draw
boundaries and thus the analysis of asymmetric information focuses on moral hazard rather
than adverse selection as the former literature is more extensive. For learning models of CEO
contracts, where either the CEOs general ability or his specic match quality with a rm is
initially unknown, we refer the reader to Harris and Holmstrom (1982), Gibbons and Mur-
phy (1992), Holmstrom (1999), Hermalin and Weisbach (1998, 2012), Taylor (2010, 2013), and
Garrett and Pavan (2012).
2. The Level of Pay
Trends in the level of pay are perhaps the most commonly cited statistic in support of the
rent extraction view. The median CEO in the S&P 500 earned $9.6 million in 2011 (Murphy
(2013)), which is substantially higher than in other countries and represents a sixfold increase
since 1980. In contrast, the pay of the average worker has risen much more slowly. Figures
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics show that CEO pay was 350 times that of the average
worker in 2013, compared to 40 times in 1980 according to the Economic Policy Institute.
Thus, the rapid increase in executive compensation may have contributed signicantly to the
recent rise in income inequality (Piketty and Saez (2003), Piketty (2014)), and has potential
political economy implications. Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that this increase is a result
of rent extraction by CEOs. Supporting this argument, Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer (2011)
show that the fraction of CEO pay relative to total pay across the top-ve executives is linked
to lower rm value, protability, and returns to acquisition announcements. We study the
extent to which rises in pay over time can be explained by shareholder value models. In this
section, we abstract from agency problems (which later introduce in Section 3) and study the
pay required to attract the CEO to a rm.
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2.1. Talent as a Factor of Production
One approach to determining the level of pay is to view the CEO as a factor of production
separate from standard employees. Let the production function be
V = F (K;L; T ) ;
where V is rm value and the factors of production are units of capital K, number of workers
L (labor), and number of managers T . Each manager is paid a wage wT = @F@T : his pay is
determined by the production function, and changes in pay result from shifts in technology. This
is the perspective of most economic theories on the aggregate production function and supply
of talent (see Goldin and Katz (2009) and Acemoglu and Autor (2012) for recent surveys). In
particular, labor economists use this perspective to compare the wages of, say, college graduates
vs. high-school dropouts.
The Lucas (1978) theory of the rm specializes the model to apply to the pay of a single
CEO, rather than several managers. The variable T now refers to the CEOs level of human
capital (i.e. his talent) rather than the number of managers. A CEO with talent T hires capital
and labor2, and maximizes:
WT = max
K;L
F (K;L; T )  wLL  rK; (1)
where wL and r are the prices of labor and capital, and the surplus WT is the CEOs pay.
Consider the Cobb-Douglas production function
V = TT

K
K
K  L
L
L
; (2)
where T , K , and L represent the shares of output that go to the CEO, capital, and labor,
respectively, under perfect competition. We assume T + K + L = 1 (constant returns to
scale). The rst-order condition of (1) with respect to K is K VK = r i.e.
K
K
= V
r
. Optimizing
over labor likewise yields L
L
= V
w
. Substituting into the production function (2) gives:
V = TT

V
r
K  V
wL
L
=
1
rKwLL
TTV 1 T :
Solving for V , we have:
V = (rKwL) 1=T T (3)
K =
KV
r
; L =
LV
wL
:
2An alternative formulation is for capital to hire the CEO and labor. In competitive markets, the identity
of the principal is immaterial. Here, we follow the Lucas (1978) formulation for ease of exposition.
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From (3), a more talented CEO runs a larger rm, in part because he hires more capital
and labor: V;K;L are all linear in T . His pay is given by
WT = V   rK   wLL = TV: (4)
The model generates the qualitative prediction that CEO pay, WT ; is increasing in rm
size, because a larger rm generates more surplus. It also generates the quantitative prediction
that his pay scales linearly with rm size. Various empirical studies conrm the qualitative
prediction that CEO pay is increasing in rm size3: Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988, p.609)
call this relationship the best documented empirical regularity regarding levels of executive
compensation.However, the quantitative prediction that pay is linear in rm size is contra-
dicted by the data. The above papers nd that CEO pay increases as a power function of
rm size WT  S, where a typical elasticity is  ' 1=3. Hence, the Lucas model needs to be
rened. This is what assignment models do, to which we now turn.
2.2. Assignment Models
Gabaix and Landier (2008) present a tractable market equilibrium model of CEO pay. A
continuum of rms and potential CEOs are matched together. Firm n 2 [0; N ] has a baseline
size S (n) and CEO m 2 [0; N ] has talent T (m). Low n denotes a larger rm and low m a
more talented CEO: S 0 (n) < 0, T 0 (m) < 0. n (m) can be thought of as the rank of the rm
(CEO), or a number proportional to it, such as its quantile of rank.
We consider the problem faced by one particular rm. At t = 0, it hires a CEO of talent
T (m) for one period. The CEOs talent increases rm value according to
V = S (n) + CT (m)S (n) ; (5)
where C parametrizes the productivity of talent and  the elasticity of talent with respect to
rm size. If  = (<) 1, the model exhibits constant (decreasing) returns to scale.
We now determine equilibrium wages, which requires us to allocate one CEO to each rm.
Let w (m) denote the equilibrium wage of a CEO with index m. Firm n, taking the market
wage of CEOs as given, selects CEO m to maximize its value net of wages:
max
m
CS (n) T (m)  w (m) :
The competitive equilibrium involves positive assortative matching, i.e. m = n, and so
w0 (n) = CS (n) T 0 (n). Let wN denote the reservation wage of the least talented CEO (n = N).
Hence we obtain the classic assignment equation (Sattinger (1993)), also derived by Terviö
3See, e.g., Roberts (1956), Baker, Jensen and Murphy (1988), Barro and Barro (1990), Cosh (1975), Frydman
and Saks (2005), Joskow et al. (1993), Kostiuk (1990), Rose and Shepard (1997), and Rosen (1992).
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(2008) in the context of CEOs:
w (n) =  
Z N
n
CS (u) T 0 (u) du+ wN : (6)
Specic functional forms are required to proceed further. We assume a Pareto rm size
distribution with exponent 1=: S (n) = An . Using results from extreme value theory,
Gabaix and Landier (2008) use the following asymptotic value for the spacings of the talent
distribution: T 0 (n) =  Bn 1. These functional forms give the wage in closed form, taking
the limit as n=N ! 0:
w (n) =
Z N
n
ABCu + 1du+wN =
ABC
   

n ( )  N ( )+wN  ABC   n ( ):
(7)
To interpret equation (7), we consider a reference rm, for instance the median rm in
the universe of the top 500 rms. Denote its index n, and its size S(n) = An  . Using
S (n) = An , we derive:
w (n) =
ABC
   n
 ( ) =
ABC
   

A1=S (n) 1=
 ( )
=
A=BC
    S (n)
 = =
(S (n)n )
=BC
    S (n)
 = =
nBC
   S(n)
=S (n) = :
Finally, we obtain CEO pay in closed form:
w (n) = D (n)S(n)=S (n)
 = ; (8)
where D (n) =  CnT 0 (n) = (   ) is a constant independent of rm size. Similar to Lucas
(1978), equation (8) yields the qualitative cross-sectional prediction that CEO pay is increasing
in rm size. However, the intuition is di¤erent: here the prediction arises because large rms
hire the most talented CEOs, who command the highest wages. Moreover, equation (8) yields
a di¤erent quantitative prediction. It predicts a pay-rm size elasticity of  =  =. Gabaix
and Landier (2008) calibrate using  = 1 (a Zipfs law, as in Axtell (2001) and Gabaix (1999))
and  = 1 (constant returns to scale). Since there is no clear a priori value for , they set
 = 2=3 to yield the empirical pay-size elasticity of  = 1=3, which contrasts Lucass (1978)
prediction of  = 1. Baranchuk, MacDonald, and Yang (2011) extend the model to endogenize
rm size and show that the pay-size relationship is stronger when industry conditions are
favorable, as talented CEOs are not only paid a greater premium but also optimally grow their
rms to a larger size.
In addition, equation (8) shows that pay increases with the size of the average rm in the
economy S (n). Since a CEOs talent can be applied to the entire rm, when rms are larger,
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the dollar benets from a more talented CEO are higher and so there is more competition for
talent. This is a similar superstarse¤ect to Rosen (1992). Moreover, the models closed form
solutions yield quantitative predictions. Average rm size increased sixfold between 1980 and
2011. When both S (n) and S (n) rise by a factor of 6, CEO pay should rise by a factor of
6 [= + (   =)] = 6 = 6, as has been the case. The relevant benchmark against which
to compare the level of CEO pay is not the pay of the average worker, or pay of CEOs in the
past, but his current contribution to the rm. This in turn depends on variables such as rm
size and talent; while the latter is di¢ cult to measure, the pay of the average worker is unlikely
to be a determinant. Thus, assignment models suggest that regulation to mandate disclosure
of the ratio of CEO pay to median employee pay may not be useful, as median employee pay
is not the relevant benchmark.
However, the empirical evidence is not unambiguously in favor of assignment models. Nagel
(2010) raises sample selection concerns and suggests alternative methodologies, but Gabaix,
Landier, and Sauvagnat (2014) conclude that the results are robust to these changes. While
Gabaix and Landier (2008) can fully explain the growth in CEO pay from 1980 to the present,
Frydman and Saks (2010) nd that median CEO pay was relatively constant between the 1940s
and early 1970s despite rm size increasing over this period. Gabaix and Landier (2008) discuss
potential explanations for this apparent discrepancy. One is that the supply of talent greatly
increased, which creates downward pressure on CEO wages; quantifying the impact of increased
supply on wages would be a useful direction for future research. Another is that, in the early
period, CEOs tended to be internally promoted rather than externally hired, similar to the
Japanese CEO market today.
In addition, observing that both rm size and CEO pay have both trended upwards since
1980 does not imply causality. Even if causal, the positive correlation between pay and rm size
cannot be interpreted as denitive evidence for assignment models, since it is also potentially
explainable by an (as yet unwritten) rent extraction model. For example, large rms may
have more resources, allowing the CEO is able to extract more salary. Alternatively, Dicks
(2012) shows that the correlation can arise if poor governance causes a small fraction of rms to
overpay for talent, which then forces all others to overpay as well in order to remain competitive.
This channel is also predicted by Gabaix and Landier (2008); see Bereskin and Cicero (2013)
for supportive evidence. While these alternative explanations would generate the qualitative
prediction that pay is positively correlated with rm size and average rm size, it is not yet
clear whether they can generate empirically consistent quantitative predictions.
Another concern is that assignment models predict a reassignment of CEOs as relative
rm size changes. While external poaching of CEOs has increased in recent years, it is still
relatively rare: Cremers and Grinstein (2014) nd that 63% of new CEOs are insiders. Similarly,
it does not appear to be the case that large changes in rm size (e.g. a rm undertaking
a large acquisition) are accompanied by changes in the acquiring CEO for non-disciplinary
reasons. This low mobility can be generated by a simple extension of assignment models to
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incorporate frictions, such as a cost of ring the CEO or rm-specic human capital.4 Writing
and calibrating such a model would be valuable.
Rather than using rm size as a proxy for talent, other authors have attempted to measure
talent directly. Chang, Dasgupta, and Hilary (2010) infer talent from the market reaction to
CEO departure, which they nd is positively related to pay. To address concerns that the
market reaction captures perception rather than true ability, they show that it is negatively
correlated to pre-departure performance. Falato, Li, and Milbourn (2015) directly measure
ability using a CEOs reputational, career, and educational credentials, which they corroborate
by showing a positive association with future rm performance. They nd that such credentials
are positively related to pay, consistent with talent-based models.
2.3. Alternative Explanations for High CEO Pay
Moving to other explanations for high CEO pay, Section 3 discusses how agency problems
may lead to the CEO being paid a premium for the disutility of e¤ort and the risk imposed
by incentives. Other papers point to the changing nature of the employment relationship.
Hermalin (2005) argues that tighter corporate governance increases both the level of e¤ort
that the CEO must exert and the risk of dismissal, and so managers demand greater pay
as a compensating di¤erential. Indeed, Peters and Wagner (2014) show that CEO turnover
risk is signicantly positively associated with pay, but reject an entrenchment model in which
powerful CEOs enjoy both lower turnover risk and high pay. Their identication strategy
focuses on industry volatility, which (after controls) is unlikely to a¤ect CEO pay other than
through turnover risk. In Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2006), CEOs specialize in knowledge
acquisition and problem solving, leaving routine production tasks to lower-level employees.
Recent increases in communication technologies (e.g. email) allow the CEO to specialize more
on skilled tasks, thus increasing his pay. Frydman (2013) and Murphy and Zabojnik (2007)
argue that the increasing importance of transferable, rather than rm-specic, human capital
increases pay through expanding CEOs outside options. Moreover, despite the signicant
relationship between pay and factors such as rm size, risk, and (as we will discuss in Section
3) performance, Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) nd that a large component is explained by
manager xed e¤ects. Inclusion of these xed e¤ects changes the coe¢ cient estimates on other
determinants; for example, the rm size coe¢ cient falls by 40%. These xed e¤ects could be a
proxy for talent (consistent with their e¤ect on the rm size coe¢ cient), for the managers ability
to extract rent, or other factors such as managerial preferences, risk aversion, or personality.
Thus, a signicant proportion in the variance of rm pay remains unexplained.
4In addition, Cremers and Grinstein (2015) nd the relationship between pay and rm size di¤ers little
across industries according to the proportion of outsider CEOs in the industry. They interpret this proportion
as a potential measure of competition for CEO talent. However, this proportion may reect small frictions
that cause a rm to choose an insider CEO on the margin, but are not large enough to meaningfully a¤ect
equilibrium pay.
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The above explanations talent, agency, and the changing nature of the CEOs job are
part of the shareholder value view. To test this view more broadly, Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach
(2013) study the e¤ect on compensation of rms transitioning from public to private ownership.
Since the private equity sponsors concentrated stake gives it the incentives and control rights
to set pay optimally, compensation in private rms should be closer to the e¢ cient benchmark.
Salary and bonuses actually rise upon going private, inconsistent with the notion that CEOs
of public rms are overpaid. They caveat that their results are based on 20 leveraged buyouts.
Due to data limitations, their inferences are based on di¤erences in means without controls, but
they show that these changes do not occur in control rms that experienced similar increases
in leverage  i.e. it is likely concentrated ownership, rather than leverage, that explains the
results. More generally, Kaplan (2012) reports that over the past three decades, executive pay
in closely-held rms has outpaced that in public companies.
In addition to the shareholder value and rent extraction views, a third perspective is that
institutional constraints or practices may have contributed to the rise of pay. Murphy (2013)
discusses the role of tax policy, accounting rules, and disclosure requirements  for example,
the Clinton Administrations $1 million salary cap led to many rms increasing salary to $1
million. Shue and Townsend (2016) note that rms tend to grant the same number of options
each year. Thus, when stock prices rise, the value of options increases which, together with
downward rigidity in salaries and bonuses, leads to overall pay levels rising in the 1990s and
early 2000s. While this friction is indeed signicant in the short run, its e¤ect on long-run
outcomes is less clear similar to economics more broadly, where pricing frictions (e.g. menu
costs) are important in the short-run but less so in the long-run.
3. Static Incentives
We now turn from determining the level of pay to the CEOs incentives. This section considers a
single-period moral hazard model, which we extend to multiple periods in Section 4. This setting
has been widely covered in textbooks (e.g. Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), Tirole (2005))
and earlier surveys (Prendergast (1999)), but typically with additive production functions and
preferences, and often a binary e¤ort level. We will show that multiplicative specications,
which may be particularly relevant for a CEO setting, lead to quite di¤erent conclusions for the
best empirical measure of incentives and how incentives should vary cross-sectionally between
rms. We will also show that the use of a continuous vs. binary action space, as well as
the specication of noise before vs. after the action, also lead to signicant di¤erences in the
models results.
We start with a standard principal-agent problem applied to an executive compensation
setting. The principal (board of directors on behalf of shareholders) hires an agent (CEO) to
run the rm. The production function is given by V (a; S; "), which is increasing in a and S.
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We specialize this to
V = S + b (S) a+ ": (9)
We consider an all-equity rm for simplicity and discuss leverage in Section 3.7. The variable
a 2 [0;1) is an action taken by the agent that improves expected rm value but is personally
costly. Examples include e¤ort (low a represents shirking), project choice (low a involves
selecting value-destructive projects that maximize private benets), or rent extraction (low a
reects cash ow diversion.) We typically refer to a as e¤ort for brevity. The variable " is
mean-zero noise, with interval support on ("; "), where the bounds may be innite.5 Shortly
after the agent takes his action, noise is realized, and then nal rm value V is realized. Firm
value is observable and contractible, but neither e¤ort nor noise are individually observable.
The function b (S) measures the e¤ect of e¤ort on rm value for a rm of size S. One
possibility is b (S) = b, which yields V (a) = S + ba + ": an additive production function
where the e¤ect of e¤ort on rm value is independent of initial rm size. This specication is
appropriate for a perk consumption decision, if the amount of perks that can be consumed is
independent of rm size. For example, buying a $10 million corporate jet reduces rm value
by $10 million, regardless of S. Another is b (S) = bS, which yields V (a) = S (1 + ba) + ": a
multiplicative production function where the e¤ect of rm value is linear in rm size. Many
CEO actions can be rolled out across the entire rm and thus have a greater e¤ect in a
larger company, such as a change in strategy or a program to improve production e¢ ciency. A
multiplicative specication is also appropriate for a rent extraction setting, if there are greater
resources to extract in a larger rm.6
The agent is paid a wage c (V ) contingent upon rm value. (Note that c refers to actual
pay, in contrast to w which refers to the expected wage). We always assume limited liability
on the principal (c (V )  V ): she cannot pay out more than total rm value. In some versions
of the model we will also assume limited liability on the agent (c (V )  0). He has reservation
utility of w  0 and his objective function is given by:
E [U ] = E [u (v (c)  g (a))] : (10)
The function g represents the cost of e¤ort, which is increasing and weakly convex. u is the
utility function and v is the felicity7 function which denotes the agents utility from cash; both
are increasing and weakly concave. g, u, and v are all twice continuously di¤erentiable. The
objective function (10) contains functions for both utility and felicity to maximize generality.
One common assumption is v(c) = c so that E [U ] = E [u (c  g (a))], in which case the cost of
5For simplicity, we assume that S is su¢ ciently large, or the probability of low " is su¢ ciently small, that V
is non-negative almost surely and so we do not need to complicate the model with non-negativity constraints.
6See Bennedsen, Perez-Gonzalez, and Wolfenzon (2010) for evidence that CEOs have the same percentage
e¤ect on rm value regardless of rm size.
7We note that the term felicity is typically used to denote one-period utility in an intertemporal model.
We use it in a non-standard manner here to distinguish it from the utility function u.
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e¤ort is pecuniary, i.e. can be expressed as a subtraction to cash pay. This is appropriate if
e¤ort involves a nancial expenditure or the opportunity cost of forgoing an alternative income-
generating activity. Another is u (x) = x, which yields E [v (c)  g (a)], where the cost of e¤ort
is separable from the benets of cash. This specication is reasonable if e¤ort involves disutility,
or forgoing leisure or private benets.
Both of the above specications represent additive preferences. E¤ort of a reduces the
agents utility by 1
2
ga2 in utils (dollars) in the rst (second) specication. A third specication
is v (c) = ln c, in which case (10) becomes E

u
 
ln
 
ce g(a)

. This specication corresponds
to multiplicative preferences, where the cost of e¤ort is increasing in c. Here, private benets
are a normal good: the utility they provide is increasing in consumption, consistent with the
treatment of most goods and services in consumer theory. This specication is also plausible
under the literal interpretation of e¤ort as forgoing leisure: a day of vacation is more valuable
to a richer CEO, as he has more wealth to enjoy during it. Thus, the CEOs expenditure on
leisure and private benets rises in proportion to his wealth. Multiplicative preferences are
also commonly used in macroeconomic models (e.g. Cooley and Prescott (1995)) to generate
realistic income e¤ects. In particular, they are necessary for labor supply to be constant over
time as the hourly wage rises.8
The principal is assumed to be risk-neutral, since shareholders are typically well-diversied.
Her program is given by:
max
c();a
E [V (a)  c (V (a))] s.t. (11)
E [u (v (c (V (a)))  g (a))]  w (12)
a 2 arg maxba E [u (v (c (V (ba)))  g (ba))] : (13)
She chooses the e¤ort level a and contract c (V )9 to maximize (11), expected rm value minus
the expected wage, subject to the agents individual rationality or participation constraint
(IR, (12)) and incentive compatibility constraint (IC, (13)).
We begin with a rst-best benchmark, which leads to a simple optimal contract that is the
same across all rms and thus does not have the potential to explain observed contracts. We
then explore two departures from the rst-best which generate a meaningful contract that does
yield empirical predictions. The rst is limited liability, which only leads to small variations
in the optimal contract across rms. The second is risk aversion (Section 3.3) which leads to
8When the hourly wage rises, working becomes preferable to leisure (the substitution e¤ect). With multi-
plicative preferences, the rise in the wage increases the agents labor endowment income and thus demand for
leisure (the income e¤ect), which exactly o¤sets the substitution e¤ect. With additive preferences, there is no
income e¤ect, and so leisure falls to zero as the wage increases.
9Here, we focus on deterministic contracts, so that there is a one-to-one mapping between rm value V and
compensation c. An even more general model allows for stochastic contracts, where rm value of V leads to a
random amount c. Gjesdal (1982), Arnott and Stiglitz (1988), and Edmans and Gabaix (2011b) derive su¢ cient
conditions for random contracts to be suboptimal, allowing the focus on deterministic contracts.
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much richer implications. Section 3.4 embeds the contracting problem in a market equilibrium
to generate additional empirical implications. We compare all implications to the data in
Section 3.5.
Under the rst-best, e¤ort is observable. Let a be the e¤ort level that the principal wishes
to implement. She can simply direct the agent to exert e¤ort a, and so we can ignore the IC
(13). It is easy to show that the agent is given a constant wage c (V ) = c, as this leads to
e¢ cient risk-sharing. The IR (12) yields c  w+ g (a). This will bind in the optimal contract,
and so the principal maximizes
E [V (a)]  g (a)  w: (14)
This denes the rst-best e¤ort level as
g0 (aFB) = b (S) : (15)
The principal trades o¤ the marginal increase in rm value from e¤ort, b (S), with the agents
marginal cost, g0 (aFB). Thus, a

FB maximizes total surplus. In turn, a

FB is decreasing in the
convexity of the cost of e¤ort. It is also increasing in rm size S if b (S) is increasing in S, since
e¤ort then has a greater dollar e¤ect in a larger rm.
We now turn to a setting in which e¤ort is unobservable and the IC (13) must be imposed.
We rst assume a risk-neutral agent, before moving to risk aversion.
3.1. Risk-Neutral Agent
We rst consider risk neutrality and additive preferences. We have u (x) = x and v (c) = c so
the participation and incentive constraints (12) and (13) specialize to
E [c (V )]  g (a)  w (16)
a 2 arg maxba E [c (V )]  g (ba) : (17)
Grossman and Hart (1983) show that the contracting problem can be solved in two stages,
which correspond to the principals two choice variables. She rst chooses the contract c (V )
that implements a given action a at least cost, and then the optimal a taking into account
the cost of the contract c (V ) needed to implement each action a. Starting with the rst stage,
the rst-order condition of the agents e¤ort choice (17) is given by
E [c0 (V ) b (S)] = g0 (a) . (18)
Rogerson (1985), Jewitt (1988), and Carroll (2012) give conditions under which the rst-order
condition is su¢ cient, and so the IC (17) can be replaced by the rst-order condition (18),
which greatly simplies the problem. Throughout this paper, we assume that these conditions
are satised, so that the rst-order approach is valid.
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Given risk neutrality and unlimited liability, there is no loss of generality in focusing on
a linear contract of the form c (V ) =  + V , where  is the xed wage and  is the agents
percentage stake in rm value. Then, using (18), in order to implement e¤ort of a, the CEOs
incentives are given by:
b (S) = g0 (a) : (19)
Empiricists typically measure the CEOs incentives to improve rm value, i.e. to exert e¤ort
a. Equation (19) shows how the optimal measure of incentives depends on how we specify the
production function. When it is additive (b (S) = b), then to implement a given e¤ort level a,
the rm must set correctly the incentive measure , the agents percentage stake in rm value
V . This measure corresponds to the dollar change in pay for a one dollar change in rm value
($-$ incentives) and is used by Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Jensen and Murphy (1990),
among others.
Hall and Liebman (1998) argue that most CEO actions have a multiplicative e¤ect on rm
value. With a multiplicative production function (b (S) = bS), we have bS = g0 (a), and so
the relevant incentive measure is S, the CEOs dollar equity stake.
This measure corresponds to the dollar change in pay for a one percentage point change
in rm value ($-% incentives). Thus, while it is common to assume an additive production
function for simplicity, researchers should think carefully about how to specify these functions
as this choice has important implications for the relevant measure of incentives a point rst
noted by Baker and Hall (2004). Moreover, if CEO e¤ort has a multiplicative e¤ect on rm
value, then CEO incentives are a quantitatively much more important issue than his level of
pay, even though the latter receives much greater attention in the media. While a $9.6 million
salary is substantial compared to average worker pay, relative to a $10 billion rm it constitutes
0.1% of rm value. In contrast, if incentives are insu¢ cient to induce the CEO to implement a
major restructuring or reject a bad acquisition, the losses to shareholders could run into several
percentage points.
Before moving to the second stage of Grossman and Hart (1983), we demonstrate the e¤ect of
multiplicative preferences, as studied by Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), while retaining
risk neutrality for now. In the general objective function (10), this corresponds to u (x) = ex
and v (c) = ln c, which yields
U = E

ce g(a)

:
We normalize a = 0, and so the t = 0 stock price (net of CEO pay) is S.10 In (9) we have
b (S) = bS, i.e. a multiplicative production function, so that rm value at t = 1 is given by
V (a) = S (1 + ba) + ":
10For simplicity, we assume that initial rm size S is net of the expected wage w.
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The IR is given by E [cja = a] = w, which yields:
w = [cja = a] = + E [V ja = a] = + S:
If the CEO exerts e¤ort a, his utility is:
E [U (a)] = E

c (a) e g(a)

= (+ EV (a)) e g(a)
= (+ S (1 + ba)) e g(a) = (w + Sba) e g(a)
= w

1 +
Sb
w
a

e g(a) = weln(1+
Sb
w
a) g(a):
The IC is a 2 arg maxa E [U (a)]. At a = 0, this yields E [U 0 (0)] = 0, i.e.
S
w
=
g0 (a)
b
: (20)
Thus, to implement a given e¤ort level a, the rm must set correctly the incentive measure
S
w
, i.e. the CEOs dollar equity stake scaled by his annual pay, or alternatively the fraction of
total pay w that is in equity. It corresponds to the percentage change in pay for a one percentage
point change in rm value (%-% incentives, i.e. the elasticity of pay to rm value), as used
by Murphy (1985), Gibbons and Murphy (1992), and Rosen (1992).
Using I , II , and III , respectively, to denote %-%, $-$, and $-% incentives, we have:
I =
@c
@r
1
w
=
 lnPay
 lnFirm Value
(21)
II =
@c
@r
1
S
=
$Pay
$Firm Value
(22)
III =
@c
@r
=
$Pay
 lnFirm Value
: (23)
where r = V=S   1 is the rms stock market return. In our one-period model, incentives arise
from new grants of stock and options, plus changes in cash pay (salary and bonuses). Thus,
these incentive measures are referred to as pay-performance sensitivity. In reality, CEOs are
in o¢ ce for multiple periods, and the vast majority of incentives stem from changes in the
value of previously granted stock and options, which swamp changes in cash pay (Jensen and
Murphy (1990), Hall and Liebman (1998)). Replacing ow compensation c in the numerator
of expressions (21) to (23) with the CEOs wealth W yields analogous expressions for wealth-
performance sensitivity, the change in the CEOs entire wealth (including previously granted
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stock and options) for a change in rm performance:
I =
@W
@r
1
w
=
 lnWealth
 lnFirm Value
(24)
II =
@W
@r
1
S
=
$Wealth
$Firm Value
(25)
III =
@W
@r
=
$Wealth
 lnFirm Value
: (26)
For example, I = @W
@r
1
w
is the percentage change in wealth for a one percentage point change
in the stock return, scaled by annual pay, which Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) call
scaled wealth-performance sensitivity. Empirical studies should consider wealth-performance
sensitivities, rather than pay-performance sensitivities, since the latter only capture a small
part of the CEOs incentives. Indeed, Core, Guay, and Thomas (2005) overturn Bebchuk and
Frieds (2004) conclusion that CEOs have weak incentives when studying wealth- rather than
pay-performance sensitivities. Section 3.4 predicts how the three incentive measures scale with
rm size and Section 3.5 tests these predictions. These tests shed light on whether utility and
production functions are additive or multiplicative, and thus the optimal measure of incentives.
We now solve for the second stage of Grossman and Hart (1983), i.e. the optimal e¤ort
level, returning to the case of additive preferences. If the agent exhibits unlimited liability,
the principal can always adjust xed pay  so that the participation constraint (16) binds.
Thus, his expected pay is E [c (V )] = w + g (a), just as in the rst-best, and so the principals
objective function remains (14). As a result, she implements the rst-best e¤ort level, dened
by (15). Using (15) and (18), the optimal contract satises
E [c0 (V ) b (S)] = b (S) . (27)
With a linear contract, this yields  = 1 and so the optimal contract is given by
c (V ) = + V , where (28)
 = w + g (a)  S   b (S) a. (29)
The principal e¤ectively sellsthe rm V to the agent for an up-front fee of  , chosen
so that the participation constraint (16) binds. Since the agent benets one-for-one from any
increase in rm value, he fully internalizes the benets of e¤ort and the rst-best e¤ort level
aFB is achieved. The level of incentives is one size ts all: regardless of the cost or utility
function, we have  = 1.
In the above framework, the e¤ort level aFB is chosen endogenously and so the principal
implements whatever e¤ort level is implied by  = 1. One simple way to obtain meaningful
contracts that do di¤er across rms is to consider a binary e¤ort decision, a 2 fa; ag, where
the principal implements a, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997), Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier
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(2009), Biais et al. (2010), and the textbook of Tirole (2005). A similar specication is a
continuous but bounded action space, a 2 [a; a], where again the principal wishes to implement
a. The upper bound reects the fact that there may be a limit to the number of actions that a
CEO can take to increase rm value. The high e¤ort level a represents full productive e¢ ciency,
rather than working 24 hours a day. In a cash ow diversion model, full productive e¢ ciency
corresponds to zero stealing; in a project selection model, it corresponds to taking all positive-
NPV projects while rejecting negative-NPV ones; in an e¤ort model, it corresponds to the CEO
not deliberately refraining from an action that will improve rm value because he prefers to
shirk. Then, from equations (19) and (20), the optimal incentive level is b (S) = g0 (a) if utility
is additive and b(S)
w
= g0 (a) if utility is multiplicative.11 Thus, the optimal level of incentives
($-$, $-%, or %-% depending on the model specication) is increasing in the cost of e¤ort g0 (a).
Incentives are higher in rms with greater agency problems, rather than one size ts all.
The rst-best is still achieved in the xed-action setting. In reality, the rst-best cannot
be achieved for two reasons. First, the agent may be subject to limited liability (c (V )  0).
Under contract (28), the agent will receive a negative payo¤ if V is su¢ ciently low, violating
limited liability. Put di¤erently, the agent may not have enough cash to buy the rm. Second,
he may be risk-averse and demand a premium for bearing the risk associated with rm value V .
We explore these two departures in turn and show that they both lead to non-trivial contracts.
3.2. Limited Liability
Innes (1990) studies the case of limited liability and risk neutrality. The optimal contract is
no longer linear and so we return to a general contract c (V ). He considers two versions of
the model. In the rst, the only restriction on the contract is limited liability on both the
principal and agent, 0  c (V )  V . To keep the proof simple, we normalize w and set g(0)
to 0, although these assumptions are not necessary. Denote by f(V; a) the probability density
function of V 2 [0; V ] conditional on e¤ort a and assume that it satises the monotone likelihood
ratio property (MLRP), i.e.
fa(V; a)
f(V; a)
is strictly increasing in V .
11When a is a boundary action, the IC becomes an inequality and a continuum of contracts will implement
a = a. We choose the contract that involves the minimum amount of incentives, as this is optimal for any
non-zero level of risk aversion, and so the IC continues to bind.
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The principals problem is given by
max
c()
Z V
0
(V   c(V ))f(V; a)dV
s.t.
Z V
0
c(V )f(V; a)dV   g (a)  w (30)Z V
0
c(V )fa(V; a
)dV = g0(a) (31)
0  c(V )  V: (32)
Note that for all contracts c() satisfying the IC (31), we haveZ V
0
c(V )f(V; a)dV   g(a) 
Z V
0
c(V )f(V; 0)dV   g(0) =
Z V
0
c(V )f(V; 0)dV  0;
where the rst inequality arises because a maximizes the agents utility if the IC (31) is satised,
and the nal inequality is due to the agents limited liability, i.e. c(V )  0. Thus, the IC (31)
implies the IR (30) and so we can ignore the latter. We thus have the following Lagrangian:
L =
Z V
0
(V   c(V ))f(V; a)dV + 
 Z V
0
c(V )fa(V; a
)dV   g0(a)
!
;
which can be rewritten as
L =
Z V
0
c(V )f(V; a)

 1 + fa(V; a
)
f(V; a)

dV +
Z V
0
V f(V; a)dV   g0(a):
Pointwise optimization with respect c (V ), subject to the limited liability constraint (32), yields
the following contract
c (V ) =
(
0 if fa(V;a
)
f(V;a) <
1

V if fa(V;a
)
f(V;a)  1
: (33)
Due to MLRP, fa(V; a)=f(V; a) is strictly increasing. Thus, there exists an bX such that
c (V ) =
(
0 if V < bX
V if V  bX ; (34)
where bX is the largest X that satises the IC (31), which can be rewritten:Z V
X
V fa(V; a
)dV = g0(a):
Contract (34) is a live-or-die contract: the agent receives the entire rm value V if it
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exceeds a threshold bX, and zero otherwise. The intuition is that the tails of the distribution
are most informative about whether the agent has exerted e¤ort. Thus, the optimal contract
punishes the agent as much as possible for left-tail realizations of V , and rewards him as much
as possible for right-tail realizations of V . With limited liability on the agent, he can receive
no less than 0 for low outputs; with limited liability on the principal, she can pay no more than
the entire rm value V for high outputs.
A potentially unrealistic feature of contract (34) is that it is discontinuous: when V rises
from bX   " to bX, the principals payo¤ falls from bX   " to 0. Thus, the principal may wish to
exercise her control rights on the rm to burnoutput from bX to bX  " to increase her payo¤.
Alternatively, since the agents pay rises more than one-for-one around this threshold, he may
wish to borrow on his own account to increase output from bX   " to bX because the gain in his
payo¤ will exceed the amount he must repay. To deter both actions, the second version of the
Innes (1990) model also assumes a monotonicity constraint: the principals payo¤ cannot fall
with rm value (V   c(V ) is nondecreasing in V ), and so the agents pay cannot increase more
than one-for-one with rm value. Following similar steps to above, the optimal contract is very
similar except that at the new cuto¤ eX < bX, the contract jumps from 0 not to V , but only to
V   eX, since this is the highest payo¤ that does not violate the monotonicity constraint. This
yields the following contract:
c (V ) =
(
0 if V < eX
V   eX if V  eX ; (35)
where eX is again the largest X that satises the IC (31), which can be rewrittenZ V
X
(V  X) fa (V; a) dV = g0 (a) :
Contract (35) is a standard call option, where the agent receives zero if V falls below a
threshold X, and the residual V   eX otherwise. The intuition is similar to contract (33):
for low output (V < eX), the agent receives the lowest possible payo¤ (0); for high output
(V > eX), he gains one-for-one with any increase in V which is the maximum possible gain
without violating monotonicity.
Contract (35) implies not only that the CEO should be paid exclusively with options, but
also that his wealth-performance sensitivity is 1 (for V > eX) i.e. he gains dollar-for-dollar
with any increase in rm value above eX.12 Thus, the only source of variation between CEOs
is the strike price eX. It is easy to show that, when the marginal cost of e¤ort c0 (a) rises, the
strike price falls in order to increase the delta of the option and maintain the agents incentives.
12If there are x existing shares outstanding and the CEO is given options on y shares, his share of rm value
is yx+y if he exercises all his options. Thus, strictly speaking, he must be given innite options to obtain a
wealth-performance sensitivity of 1.
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Hence, even though the optimal contract is no longer trivial, this model does not capture much
of the cross-sectional variation in real-life CEO contracts.
In reality, while CEOs are often paid with options in practice, they also receive salary,
bonuses, and stock. Moreover, they often have very few shares compared to the number of
shares outstanding, meaning that they gain far less than dollar-for-dollar with any increase
in rm value. This wealth-performance sensitivity di¤ers widely across rms, which the above
model does not capture. We now incorporate risk aversion, which leads to the optimal sensitivity
being below 1 and di¤ering across CEOs. In addition to the strength of incentives, these models
will also derive predictions for the optimal shape of contracts whether they should be linear
or convex, and thus whether they should comprise stock or options.
3.3. Risk-Averse Agent
Returning to the case of unlimited liability, another route to a meaningful contract is to have
a risk-averse agent. Under the general utility function (10), and returning to general (rather
than linear) contracts, the agents rst-order condition is given by:
E [u0 () (v0 (c) c0 (V ) b (S)  g0 (a))] = 0. (36)
Even assuming a given implemented action a, the contracting problem remains di¢ cult because
equation (36) only requires the contract to satisfy the agents incentive constraint on average.
Even in the simplest case in which u is linear, the agents average expected marginal benet
from e¤ort, E [v0 (c) c0 (V ) b (S)], must equal the (known) marginal cost of e¤ort, g0 (a). There
are many potential contracts that will satisfy the incentive constraint on average, and so the
problem is complex because the principal must solve for the one contract out of this continuum
that minimizes the expected wage. (The problem is more complex if u is non-linear).
3.3.1. Holmstrom-Milgrom Framework
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987, HM) showed that the contracting problem becomes substan-
tially simpler if four assumptions are made. First, the agent exhibits exponential utility, so
u (x) =  e x, where  is the coe¢ cient of absolute risk aversion. Second, the cost of e¤ort
is pecuniary, so v (c) = c. Third, the noise " is Normal, i.e. "  N (0; 2). Fourth, they
consider a multi-period model where the agent chooses his e¤ort every instant in continuous
time. Under these assumptions, HM show that the optimal contract is linear, i.e. c = + V ,
and that the problem is equivalent to a single-period static problem. The intuition is that a
linear contract subjects the agent to a constant incentive pressure irrespective of the history
of past performance. This result suggests that incentives should be implemented purely with
stock, and not non-linear instruments such as options.
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The principals problem becomes:
max E [V   c] (37)
s.t. E
h
 e [c  12ga2]
i
  e w (38)
a 2 arg maxba E
h
 e [c  12gba2]i : (39)
Substituting for c =  + V and V = S + b (S) a + ", the agents objective function simplies
to:
 e bc(a); (40)
where bc (a) =  +  (S + b (S) a)   1
2
ga2   
2
22 is his utility from the contract. It comprises
the expected wage  +  (S + b (S) a), minus the cost of e¤ort 1
2
ga2, minus the risk premium

2
22 that the agent requires. This risk premium is increasing in the agents risk aversion ,
risk 2, and incentives . The agent maximizes (40) by selecting
a =
b (S)
g
: (41)
His e¤ort choice is independent of risk 2 and risk aversion , since noise is additive. It is also
independent of the xed wage , since exponential utility removes wealth e¤ects. Thus,  can
be adjusted to satisfy the agents participation constraint without a¤ecting his incentives.
Plugging (41) into the principals objective function (37) and setting the participation con-
straint (38) to bind, the optimal level of incentives is
 =
1
1 + g


b(S)
2 : (42)
Optimal incentives  are a trade-o¤ between two forces. A sharper contract increases e¤ort
a = b(S)
g
and thus rm value, but also increases disutility 1
2
ga2 and the risk premium 
2
22.
Thus,  is decreasing in risk aversion  and risk 2 as these augment the risk premium required.
The e¤ect of the cost of e¤ort g is more nuanced. On the one hand, xing a, the required
incentives are  = a
g
b(S)
and is increasing in g. On the other hand, when e¤ort is costlier to
implement (g is higher), the optimal e¤ort level a is lower. The second e¤ect dominates: when
e¤ort is costlier, an increase in  leads to a smaller rise in e¤ort, and so the optimal  falls.
(Since the benet of e¤ort b () has the opposite e¤ect of the cost of e¤ort g, we discuss only
the latter throughout).
To nd xed pay , we set the participation constraint to bind (bc (a) = w). This yields
 = w   S   1
2
(b (S))2
g
+

2
22:
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The comparative statics for  are ambiguous (see Appendix A). On the one hand, a higher
cost of e¤ort g, higher risk aversion , and higher risk 2 increase the required xed pay  as
a compensating di¤erential (i.e. to ensure the IR remains satised). On the other hand, these
changes also reduce the optimal level of incentives (from (42)), which lowers the risk premium.
The HM framework is attractive for a number of reasons. First, it derives (rather than
assumes) a linear contract as being optimal. Second, it solves for not only the optimal contract
to implement a given e¤ort level, but also the optimal e¤ort level, i.e. both stages of Grossman
and Hart (1983). Solving for the optimal e¤ort level is valuable not so much because empiricists
test the models predictions for the e¤ort level (which is hard to observe), but as will be made
clear shortly endogenizing the e¤ort level leads to di¤erent predictions for the contract (which
is observed). Third, the xed salary  does not a¤ect the agents e¤ort choice. Thus, changes
in reservation utility can be simply met by varying , without changing incentives.
However, HM stressed that a number of assumptions were necessary for their linearity result:
exponential utility, a pecuniary cost of e¤ort, Normal noise, and continuous time. Hellwig and
Schmidt (2002) show that linearity continues to hold in discrete time under two additional
assumptions: the principal does not observe the time path of prots (only the total prot in
the nal period), and the agent can destroy prots before he reports them to the principal. In
Appendix B we discuss the role played by the rst three assumptions.
The HM model has proven extremely inuential due to its tractability. Given the benets
of tractability, researchers have attempted to achieve tractability in other settings. We explore
these alternative models here.
3.3.2. Fixed Target Action
In HM, the e¤ort level a = b(S)
g
is chosen endogenously. As described in Section 3.1, an
alternative specication is for the principal to implement a xed target action a. The optimal
contract is now b (S) = ga, which leads to very di¤erent empirical implications. Now, the level
of incentives b (S) (or b(S)
w
with multiplicative utility) arises from the desire to induce e¤ort
a, and not any trade-o¤ with disutility or risk. Thus, only the rst e¤ect of g exists a higher
cost of e¤ort raises the incentives required to induce a and so incentives are increasing in
g, in contrast to HM. It is also increasing in the target e¤ort a, but independent of  and 2,
since the contract is not determined by any trade-o¤ with these parameters. Thus, if the xed
action model accurately represents reality, it has the attractive practical implication that the
contract does not depend on the agents risk aversion, which is typically hard to observe. It
thus o¤ers a potential explanation for why real-world contracts do not seem as complicated and
contingent on as many details of the environment as standard contract theories would suggest.
For example, Section 3.5 shows that there is no systematic relationship between incentives and
risk; the textbook of Bolton and Dewatripont (2005, p158) notes that what is surprising is the
relative simplicity of observed managerial compensation packages given the complexity of the
incentive problem. These details do not matter because the contract is determined by the need
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to induce e¤ort a, rather than a trade-o¤ with risk. In addition, we now have unambiguous
predictions for how increases in risk 2 and risk aversion  a¤ect the level of pay. There is
now only the direct e¤ect, that pay rises as a compensating di¤erential, but no indirect e¤ect
because these parameters do not a¤ect the optimal e¤ort level.
Whether the endogenous or xed action model is more realistic depends on the setting. In
many cases, the endogenous action case is more accurate as principals choose to implement less-
than-full e¤ort to save on wages. For example, a factory boss may only require a production
operative to work an eight-hour day, to avoid paying overtime. However, for CEOs, a xed
action may be more appropriate. Edmans and Gabaix (2011b) show that, if CEO e¤ort has a
multiplicative e¤ect on rm value, implementing full productive e¢ ciency a is optimal if the
rm is large enough. (The result also holds for any increasing function b (S)). The benets
of e¤ort are a function of rm size; the cost of e¤ort (a higher wage to compensate for risk
and disutility) is a function of the CEOs reservation wage w. Thus, if S is su¢ ciently large
compared to w, the benets of e¤ort dominate the trade-o¤ and it is optimal to induce full
productive e¢ ciency regardless of g,  or 2. For example, in a $10bn rm, if implementing
e¤ort level a    rather than a reduces rm value by only 0:1%, this translates into $10m. If
the CEO salary is $10m, even if salary can be reduced by 50% by allowing the CEO to exert
only a   , implementing a remains optimal. Indeed, the structural estimation of Margiotta
and Miller (2000) nds that the costs of inducing e¤ort are substantially less than the benets.
The xed action model more likely applies to CEOs than rank-and-le employees, who have a
limited e¤ect on rm value.
The overall point that we would like to stress is not that one model is superior to the other.
Di¤erent models apply to di¤erent scenarios. Rather, we wish to highlight how a contract-
ing models empirical implications hinge critically on the assumptions whether we specify
multiplicative versus additive production or preference functions, or a xed versus continuous
implemented action. Sometimes, researchers may assume a binary action space or additive
functions out of convenience, but this modeling choice can lead to vastly di¤erent predictions.
3.3.3. Noise Before Action
The framework of Edmans and Gabaix (2011b, EG) provides another way to obtain tractable
contracts, without the need to assume exponential utility, a pecuniary cost of e¤ort, or Normal
noise. It considers the implementation of a given e¤ort level a, i.e. the rst stage of Grossman
and Hart (1983), and thus is particularly applicable to CEOs where a = a if the rm is large.
EG specify the noise " as being realized before, rather than after the action a is taken. This
timing is also featured in models in which the agent observes total cash ow before deciding how
much to divert (e.g., Lacker and Weinberg (1989), Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007),
DeMarzo and Fishman (2007)), and in which he observes the state of naturebefore choosing
e¤ort (Harris and Raviv (1979), Sappington (1983), Baker (1992), and Prendergast (2002)).
Note that this timing assumption does not render the CEO immune to risk, because noise is
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unknown when he signs his contract. EG also show that the contract retains the same form in
continuous time, where noise and e¤ort occur simultaneously. This consistency suggest that,
if underlying reality is continuous time, it is best approximated in discrete time by modeling
noise before e¤ort.
The timing assumption allows for signicant tractability. Since the noise is known when the
agent takes his action, we can remove the expectation from his objective function (10) to yield:
u (v (c (S + b (S) a+ "))  g (a)) : (43)
In turn, u () also drops out. The specic form of u is irrelevant since it is monotonic, it is
maximized by maximizing its argument. This yields the rst-order condition:
v0 (c (S + b (S) a + ")) c0(S + b (S) a + ")b (S) = g0 (a) : (44)
This rst-order condition must hold for every possible ", i.e., state-by-state, rather than simply
on average. This pins down the slope of the contract: for all ", the agent must receive a marginal
felicity of g0 (a) for a marginal increase in V . Thus, for all V , the contract must satisfy:
v0 (c (V )) c0 (V ) b (S) = g0 (a) :
Integrating over 0 to V , we obtain in felicity units:
v (c (V )) =
g0 (a)
b (S)
V + k,
for an integration constant k. This yields, in dollar terms,
c (V ) = v 1

g0 (a)
b (S)
V + k

(45)
The constant k is chosen to make the participation constraint bind, i.e.
E

u

g0 (a)
b(S)
V + k   g (a)

= w: (46)
There is a unique optimal contract. The slope is chosen so that the incentive constraint
(44) holds state-by-state, and the scalar k is chosen so that the participation constraint binds.
Equation (45) shows that the optimal contract is typically non-linear. Even though the
noise is known when the agent takes his action, it is not irrelevant because it has the potential
to undo the agents incentives. If " is high, V and thus c will already be high; a high reservation
wage w increases the required constant k and thus c, and so has the same e¤ect. If the agent
exhibits diminishing marginal felicity (i.e., v is concave), he has lower incentives to exert e¤ort.
Put di¤erently, the agent does not face risk (as " is known) but distortion (as " a¤ects his e¤ort
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incentives). HM assume that the cost of e¤ort is in nancial terms so that like the benet
of e¤ort it also declines with ", and so incentives are unchanged with a linear contract. EG
instead address distortion by the shape of the contract: it is convex, via the v 1 transformation.
If noise is high, the contract gives a greater number of dollars for each incremental unit of rm
value (c0 (V )), to o¤set the lower marginal felicity of each dollar (v0(c)). Therefore, the marginal
felicity from e¤ort remains v0(c)c0 (V ) b (S) = g0 (a), and incentives are preserved regardless of
w or ". Allowing for convex contracts removes the need to assume a pecuniary cost of e¤ort.
In contrast, if v is convex, the contract is concave.
The contract is linear in two special cases. The rst is a pecuniary cost of e¤ort, as in
HM: when v(c) = c, we have c (V ) = g
0(a)
b(S)
V + k. With an additive production function
( = 0), the CEOs dollar incentives are linear in the rms dollar value V ; with a multiplicative
production function ( = 1), they are linear in the rms percentage return V
S
. The former
result echoes Lacker and Weinberg (1989), who also feature a pecuniary cost of e¤ort and
an additive production function. They show that the optimal contract to deter all cash ow
diversion (the analogy of a = a) is piecewise linear. The second case is v (c) = ln c, i.e.
multiplicative preferences. The contract is ln c (V ) = g
0(a)
b(S)
V + k, and so log pay is linear in
V (V
S
) with an additive (multiplicative) production function. In both cases, the framework
delivers linear contracts without requiring exponential utility or Normal noise. More broadly,
the framework allows for contracts that are convex and concave, rather than purely linear as
in HM thus, tractability can be achieved without linearity and shows what determines the
optimal curvature or linearity of the contract: the form of v ().
Equation (45) also claries the parameters that do and do not matter for the contracts
functional form. It depends only on the felicity function v and the cost of e¤ort g. The functional
form is independent of the utility function u, the reservation utility w, and the distribution of
the noise ", i.e. the contract can be written without reference to these parameters. These
parameters will still a¤ect the contracts slope via their impact on the scalar k. However,
the contracts slope as well as its functional form are independent of u, w, and " in the cases
of v (c) = c and v (c) = ln c, where it depends only on g0 (a). This detail-independence
contrasts with standard agency models where the contract depends on many specic features
of the setting.13
The above framework allows for tractable contracts with fewer restrictions on the utility
function, cost of e¤ort, and noise distribution, as well as non-linear contracts. This tractability
allows it to be used in dynamic models with private saving (Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and
Sannikov (2012)) and assignment models with moral hazard under risk aversion (Edmans and
Gabaix (2011a)). However, it has a number of disadvantages. It requires the assumption that
noise precedes the action; while applicable in some settings (e.g. a cash ow diversion model),
it may not apply to others. It also assumes a xed implemented action a, which again may
13Chassang (2013) derives contracts that are relatively independent of the environment (i.e. the probability
space), in a risk-neutral setting.
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only apply in some settings (e.g. a CEO of a large rm). The goal of this article is to provide
a range of modeling frameworks, each of which may be applicable under di¤erent conditions.
3.3.4. Constant Relative Risk Aversion and Lognormal Firm Value
We have so far considered two models that yield tractable contracts at the cost of some as-
sumptions. Other papers do not aim to achieve a tractable analytical solution, but instead
to calibrate the optimal contract, and so use fewer assumptions. Perhaps the most commonly
used framework for calibration involves constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility and
lognormal rm value, studied by Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991), Hall and Murphy
(2000, 2002), Hall and Knox (2004), and others. We present here the version calibrated in
Dittmann and Maug (2007). End-of-period rm value is given by
VT = V0(a) exp

R  
2
2

T + "
p
T

;
where "  N(0; 1) and V0 satises V 00 > 0 and V 000 < 0. They assume that a contract is composed
of salary ,  shares, and  options (as a fraction of shares outstanding) with strike price X
and maturity T .14 Both shares and options are paid out at the end of the period; salary 
is paid out at the start. The CEO begins with non-rm wealth W0, which is invested at the
risk-free rate R. His end-of-period wealth is then given by
cT = (+W0)e
RT + VT +  maxfVT  X; 0g:
In the general utility function (10), we have u (x) = x and v (cT ) =
c1 T
1  , where  is the
parameter of relative risk aversion. Thus, the CEOs preferences are given by
U(cT ; a) =
c1 T
1     g(a):
Assuming risk-neutral pricing, the CEOs end-of-period pay (change in wealth) is given by
T = e
RT + VT +  maxfVT  X; 0g:
with expected present value
0 = E[e
 RTT ] = + V0 +  BS;
where BS denotes the Black-Scholes value of the option. They solve for the rst stage of
Grossman and Hart (1983), in which the principal wishes to implement action a, and so her
14In an additional analysis, Dittmann and Maug (2007) also solve for the optimal unrestricted contract.
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problem is given by
min
;; 
0 = + V0 +  BS
s.t. E[U(WT ; a)]  U;
a = arg max
a2[0;1)
E[U(WT ; a)]
+W0  0, 0    1;   0
Dittmann and Maug (2007) calibrate this model to a sample of 598 US CEOs. In particular,
they study whether it is more e¢ cient to incentivize the CEO with stock or options. Since
options are riskier, $1 of options is worth less to the CEO than $1 of stock, rendering them
less e¤ective in meeting the CEOs participation constraint. On the other hand, $1 of options
provides greater incentives than $1 of stock, rendering them more e¤ective in meeting his
incentive constraint. They nd that the rst e¤ect is dominant, suggesting that the optimal
contract should involve only stock and not options. This prediction is shared with Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987) who predict linear contracts, although in a di¤erent setting. Moreover,
when they drop the restriction that the contract must be piecewise linear (i.e. consist of salary,
stock, and options), they nd that the optimal nonlinear contract is concave.
In contrast to both frameworks, option compensation is widespread in the U.S. One inter-
pretation, consistent with Bebchuk and Fried (2004), is that the use of options indicates rent
extraction: since at-the-money options did not have to be expensed until 2006, they constitute
stealth compensationnot noticed by shareholders. Indeed, Hayes, Lemmon, and Qiu (2012)
found that the use of options fell substantially after FAS 123R mandated that the economic
value of an option be expensed, thus leading to an accounting charge for at-the-money options.
However, Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010) show that options can be rationalized if the CEO
is loss-averse: since options provide downside protection, they are particularly valuable to a
loss-averse agent. Moreover, as we will discuss in Section 3.7, if the agent chooses rm risk in
addition to e¤ort, options may be useful to induce him to take value-adding risky projects.
3.4. Incentives in Market Equilibrium
Section 3 has thus far taken the reservation wage w as given. We now endogenize w using
the assignment model of Gabaix and Landier (2008) to study how CEO incentives vary across
rms in market equilibrium. We use the Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) framework of a
risk-neutral CEO, multiplicative preferences and a xed target action, as in Section 3.1, with
a = a. We will show that even this simple model leads to predictions consistent with empirical
ndings. (Edmans and Gabaix (2011a) extend the model to risk aversion.)
From (20), we have  = w
S
where  = g0 (a). The xed salary  is chosen so that the IR
binds, i.e.  = w   S = w (1  ). Thus, the CEO in rm n is given a xed salary , and
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S worth of shares, with:
nSn = w (n) ; (47)
n = w (n) (1  ) ; (48)
where w (n) is given by equation (8) from Gabaix and Landier (2008). Thus, a fraction  of
the equilibrium wage is paid in equity, and the remainder is paid in cash.
We can now solve for the three incentive measures in equations (21)-(23) in terms of model
primitives:
I =  / S0 (49)
II = 
w
S
/ S 1 (50)
III = w / S; (51)
Equation (20) earlier suggested that, in a multiplicative model, the optimal incentive mea-
sure is I (%-% incentives) since it a¤ects the implemented e¤ort level. Equations (49)-(51)
illustrate a related advantage: in a multiplicative model, I is independent of rm size and
thus comparable across rms of di¤erent size. Intuitively, since e¤ort has a percentage e¤ect on
both rm value and CEO utility, it is %-% incentives that are relevant. Comparability across
rms of di¤erent size is useful to study which rms are incentivized more or less than their
peers. For example, a passive investor who believes that incentives are not fully priced in the
market may wish to invest in a stock with high CEO incentives; an activist investor may wish
to target a rm with low incentives. However, if the CEO of a large rm has $2m of equity and
the CEO of a smaller rm has $1m of equity, we cannot immediately conclude which CEO is
better incentivized as dollar equity holdings should optimally increase with rm size. Relatedly,
comparability is valuable for boards or compensation consultants undertaking benchmarking
analyses.15
While %-% incentives should be independent of size, with  =    = = 1=3 as in Gabaix
and Landier (2008), $-$ incentives should have a rm-size elasticity of    1 =  2=3. If e¤ort
has a multiplicative e¤ect on rm value, it has a higher dollar e¤ect in a larger rm, and so
a lower equity stake is needed to induce e¤ort. In addition, $-% incentives should have an
elasticity of  = 1=3. Larger rms hire more talented CEOs, who command higher wages.
Since the benets of shirking are higher, given multiplicative preferences, a higher dollar equity
stake is needed to induce e¤ort. In Section 3.5, we will compare these predictions to the data.
Turning to the strength of incentives, the $-$ incentives measured by Jensen and Murphy
(1990) are given by II = I w
S
. Since rm size S is substantially larger than the CEOs wage w,
$-$ incentives should be low. Because rms are so large, the dollar benets of e¤ort are much
15By analogy, fund managers are compared according to their risk-adjusted percentage returns, rather than
dollar returns, as the former is comparable across funds of di¤erent size (assuming constant returns to scale).
28
greater than the disutility cost to the CEO, and so only a small equity stake is needed to induce
e¤ort. Another strand of research justies low $-$ incentives by pointing out the disadvantages
of strong incentives. Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia (1991) show that a high equity stake
may induce the CEO to take ine¢ ciently low risk. Benmelech, Kandel, and Veronesi (2010)
assume that equity incentives vest in the short-term, since long-term incentives expose the
CEO to risks outside his control. Then, the CEO may conceal information that his investment
opportunities have declined to keep the current stock price high, even though disclosing such
information will allow him to e¢ ciently disinvest. In a similar vein, Peng and Roell (2008,
2014) and Goldman and Slezak (2006) demonstrate that high-powered incentives, that vest in
the short term, can encourage the manager to expend rm resources to manipulate the stock
price upwards. However, these disadvantages can potentially be avoided by granting equity
with long vesting horizons.
3.5. Empirical Analyses
We now turn to tests of the empirical predictions of these models. The rst set of tests study
the level of incentives. Motivated by traditional additive models, Jensen and Murphy (1990)
estimate $-$ incentives and showed that the CEO loses only $3.25 for every $1,000 loss in rm
value, an e¤ective equity stake of only 0.325%. They interpreted this stake as too low to be
reconciled with optimal contracting, and thus concluded that CEOs are paid like bureaucrats.
However, such a conclusion hinges critically on whether we believe CEO e¤ort has additive or
multiplicative e¤ects on rm value and CEO utility. $-$ incentives are the relevant measure
only in an additive model. As discussed above, in a multiplicative model, %-% incentives are
relevant and $-$ incentives should optimally be low. In Hall and Liebman (1998), $-% incentives
are relevant i.e. dollar ownership, rather than percentage ownership. They overturned Jensen
and Murphys conclusion by showing that dollar ownership is sizable.
Separately, theory predicts that incentives should be ag
b(S)
or 1
1+g( b(S))
2 , but parameters
such as the cost of e¤ort g are di¢ cult to quantify. Thus, it is di¢ cult to evaluate whether
quantitative ndings on the level of incentives are consistent with e¢ ciency. Haubrichs (1994)
calibration suggests that the seemingly low incentives found by Jensen and Murphy (1990)
can be optimal if the CEO is su¢ ciently risk-averse, but attaches wide condence intervals to
his conclusion given the di¢ culties in calibration. The structural estimation of Margiotta and
Miller (2000) also nds that low incentives are su¢ cient to induce e¤ort given the multiplicative
e¤ect of e¤ort on rm value.
Given the di¢ culties of quantifying parameters such as g to calculate the optimal level
of incentives, incentive theories are typically tested instead in terms of their cross-sectional
predictions whether they vary with parameters such as S, g,  and 2 as predicted. Note
that it is important for empirical tests to study the precise measure of incentives predicted by
the theory. For example, if the theory is a multiplicative model that predicts how the dollar
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equity stake S varies with g, , and 2, studying the percentage equity stake  will not be a
precise test of the model as these parameters may vary with rm size S. In addition, equation
(42) implies that with a multiplicative production function (b (S) = S), the relevant measure of
risk is 
S
, the volatility of the rms percentage returns; with an additive production function
( = 0) it is the , the volatility of the rms dollar returns.
Starting with size, Jensen and Murphy (1990) found that $-$ incentives are even lower in
large rms, perhaps because governance is particularly weak in these rms. As discussed above,
Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009) show that, under a multiplicative model, CEO e¤ort
has a larger dollar e¤ect in a bigger rm, and so a smaller equity stake is required to induce
e¤ort. They quantitatively predict a rm-size elasticity of  2=3, consistent with their empirical
nding of  0:60. Similarly, they nd that $-$ incentives are independent of rm size and $-%
incentives have a size-elasticity of 1=3, both as predicted. Thus, a model with multiplicative
utility and production functions quantitatively explains the size-scalings of incentives. While
these results are consistent with incentives being set optimally and the true model indeed being
multiplicative, they could also be consistent with a non-multiplicative model and suboptimal
incentive setting.
We now turn to HMs prediction that incentives  are decreasing in risk . While Lambert
and Larcker (1987), Aggarwal and Samwick (1999), and Jin (2002) indeed nd a negative
relationship, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Core and Guay (1999), Oyer and Schaefer (2005), and
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) document a positive relationship, and Garen (1994), Yermack
(1995), Bushman, Indjejikian, and Smith (1996), Ittner, Larcker, and Rajan (1997), Conyon
and Murphy (1999), Edmans, Gabaix, and Landier (2009), and Cheng, Hong, and Scheinkman
(2015) show either no relationship or mixed results. Aggarwal and Samwick (1999) and Jin
(2002) study the volatility of dollar returns, and the other papers study percentage returns.
Thus, the empirical evidence points to a weak relationship between risk and incentives. The
xed action model provides a potential explanation: risk is second-order compared to the
benets of e¤ort it is incentive considerations, not risk considerations, that a¤ect the slope
of the contract.16
The prediction that  is decreasing in risk aversion  is harder to test as risk aversion is
unobservable. Becker (2006) uses data on CEO wealth, available in Sweden, as a (negative)
proxy for risk aversion under the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion. As predicted,
he nds that wealth is positively related to both $-$ and %-% incentives.17 In addition, wealth
can a¤ect incentives through channels other than risk aversion. In the EG model, where the
16Prendergast (2002) provides another explanation for the weak relationship between risk and incentives.
When uncertainty is low, principals assign tasks to agents and directly monitor them. When uncertainty is high,
they delegate tasks to agents and incentivize them through output. His model applies principally to rank-and-le
employees, since day-to-day monitoring of the CEO by directors is more limited.
17While HM assume CARA utility and so risk aversion is independent of wealth, the model of Sannikov
(2008), analyzed in Section 4.2, generally predicts that incentives fall with risk aversion by the same intuition
as in HM. His model allows for general utility functions, and thus absolute risk aversion to be decreasing in
wealth.
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contract is not driven by a trade-o¤with risk aversion, the CEOs outside option w may include
consuming his existing wealth. Higher wealth increases w and thus the constant k (equation
(46)), which in turn augments incentives (equation (45)). Intuitively, if the CEO is wealthier,
his marginal utility from money is lower, and so greater incentives are required to induce him
to work. More generally, while studies have shown that incentives are signicantly related to
determinants such as rm size, risk, and wealth, Coles and Li (2013) nd that a large portion is
explained by manager xed e¤ects, similar to Graham, Li, and Qiu (2012) who nd signicant
manager xed e¤ects for pay levels. Thus, a sizable component of the variation in incentives
remain unexplained.
The theories also derive predictions for expected pay E [c], often referred to as the level
of pay. As discussed, rm risk and disutility have an ambiguous e¤ect on the level of pay in
the HM model, but increase it in the xed action model due to the required compensating
di¤erential. Garen (1994) shows that pay is insignicantly increasing in rm risk as measured
by dollar volatility, and insignicantly decreasing in percentage volatility. Cheng, Hong, and
Scheinkman (2015) nd a signicant positive relationship with percentage volatility for nancial
rms. Gayle and Miller (2009) show theoretically and empirically that larger rms are more
complex to manage, and so CEOs require greater pay in return. In addition, greater agency
problems in large rms necessitate higher equity incentives and thus more pay as a risk premium.
Conyon, Core, and Guay (2011) and Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and Murphy (2013) compare
CEO pay in the U.S. to the rest of the world, and show that the pay premium to U.S. CEOs
can be explained by the greater risk that they bear, rather than rent extraction. The structural
estimation of Gayle, Golan, and Miller (2015) nds that the risk premium can explain over 80%
of the pay di¤erential between small and large rms. It arises both because large rms require
greater incentives to address moral hazard, and also because stock returns are a poorer signal
of e¤ort in large rms.
3.6. Multiple Signals
The analysis has thus far studied the sensitivity of the managers pay to the performance of
his own rm. Here, we study the extent to which it should depend on other signals, such as
industry and market conditions. We rst demonstrate the Holmstrom (1979) informativeness
principle. This principle considers the case in which, in addition to rm value V , the principal
has access to an additional contractible signal z (such as the performance of peers) and studies
the extent to which CEO pay c should depend on z. The joint density function is given by
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f(V; z; a), and the principals problem is:
max
c(;)
Z
z
Z V
0
(V   c(V; z))f(V; z; a)dV dz (52)
s.t.
Z
z
Z V
0
u(c(V; z))f(V; z; a)dV dz  g(a) (53)Z
z
Z V
0
u(c(V; z))fa(V; z; a
)dV dz = g0(a) (54)
Denote by  and  the Lagrange multipliers for the IR (53) and IC (54), respectively. Pointwise
optimization yields the following condition for the optimal contract c(V; z):
1
u0(c(V; z))
= + 
fa(V; z; a
)
f(V; z; a)
for all (V; z). Hence, assuming that  6= 0 (i.e. the IC binds), the contract c(V; z) is not a
function of z if and only if the likelihood ratio fa(V; z; a)=f(V; z; a) does not depend on z, i.e.
fa(V; z; a
)
f(V; z; a)
= h(V; a): (55)
for some function h. Condition (55) holds if and only if V is a su¢ cient statistic for fV; zg
with respect to a = a.18 Thus, any signal z, no matter how noisy, that provides information
incremental to V on the agents e¤ort choice, should be included in the contract.
The most common application of the informativeness principle to CEO pay is relative per-
formance evaluation (RPE). Specically, peer performance is informative about the degree
to which high rm value V is due to high e¤ort or good luck and so should enter the contract.
For example, CEO pay should be based on performance relative to a peer group, rather than
using standard stock and options whose value is based on absolute performance.
However, Holmstroms result was derived assuming optimal contracts. In reality, contracts
may not be perfectly optimal. For example, a preference for simplicity can lead to the use of
piecewise linear contracts  indeed, cash, stock, and options are typically used in practice.19
Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2013) study the e¤ect of indexation when contracts are restricted
to these instruments and show that the indexation of options can destroy incentives. Since
an indexed option is in the money only if the stock price rises high enough to outperform the
benchmark, indexation is tantamount to increasing the strike price of an option and reducing
the drift rate of the underlying asset. Both e¤ects reduce the options delta and thus his
18Condition (55) is required to be satised only for e¤ort level a = a; it may be that the likelihood ratio
depends on z for a di¤erent a 6= a. We thus say that (55) holds if and only if V is a su¢ cient statistic for
fV; zg with respect to a = a. Holmstrom (1979) assumes that condition (55) is satised either for all a or no
a, and so he shows that the contract is a function of z if and only if V is a su¢ cient statistic for fV; zg with
respect to a (rather than a = a).
19See Gabaix (2014) for a sparsity-based model where agents have a preference for simplicity.
32
incentives. To preserve incentives, additional equity must be given, and their calibration shows
that full indexation of all options would increase compensation costs by 50% on average. If rms
choose the optimal proportion of options to index, average compensation costs would only fall
by 2.3%, and 75% of rms would choose zero indexation. They show that indexing stock also
has little benet. Chaigneau, Edmans, and Gottlieb (2016b) study limited liability, another
contracting constraint relevant in reality, and show that the informativeness principle may no
longer hold. In the standard Innes (1990) framework, the agent receives zero below a threshold
and gains one-for-one above the threshold, which is the maximum possible without violating the
agents monotonicity constraint (if imposed) or principals limited liability (if monotonicity is
not imposed). Since constraints on the contract are binding almost everywhere, the principals
ability to use the signal is severely restricted. If low rm value V is accompanied by a low
signal z, she cannot punish the agent further without violating limited liability as he is already
receiving zero. Her only degree of freedom is on the level of the threshold, and so a signal is only
valuable if it a¤ects the optimal cuto¤. Moreover, Chaigneau, Edmans, and Gottlieb (2016b)
show that even if a signal has strictly positive value because it a¤ects the optimal cuto¤, its
usage can also weaken incentives (similar to Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2013)), and so its
value is quantitatively small.
In addition, other concerns can lead to pay optimally depending on industry performance.
Oyer (2004) shows that, if equity is forfeited upon departure, it induces the agent to stay
with the rm. Since non-indexed equity is more valuable in high market conditions, when the
outside option is also higher, its retention power increases precisely when retention concerns
are greatest. Gopalan, Milbourn, and Song (2010) argue that not indexing an executive to
industry performance induces him to choose the rms industry exposure optimally. DeMarzo
and Kaniel (2015) and Liu and Sun (2015) show that, when CEOs have relative wealth concerns,
it is optimal for the rm to pay him for general industry upswings to ensure that his pay does
not lag his industry peers.
Turning to the evidence, conventional wisdom is that RPE is very rarely used in reality. Ag-
garwal and Samwick (1999) and Murphy (1999) show that CEO pay is determined by absolute,
rather than relative performance, and Jenter and Kanaan (2015) nd an absence of RPE in
CEO ring decisions. However, more recent evidence suggests that RPE may be more common
than previously thought. Albuquerque (2009) argues that relevant peers are not only rms
in the same industry, but also those of similar size, since common external shocks may a¤ect
di¤erent rms in the same industry in di¤erent ways  for example, increases in regulation
may be particularly costly for small rms. When dening rms according to both industry and
size, rather than industry alone, she nds signicant evidence for RPE. Gong, Li, and Shin
(2011) argue that conclusions that RPE is rare arise from identifying RPE based on an im-
plicit approach assuming a peer group (e.g. one based on industry and/or size) and relevant
performance measures, and studying whether those performance measures for that peer group
a¤ect CEO pay. These assumptions may lead to measurement error that biases downwards
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the estimated use of RPE. Gong et al. study the explicit use of RPE, based on the disclosure
of peer rms and performance measures mandated by the SEC in 2006. They nd that 25%
of S&P 1500 rms explicitly use RPE. Similarly, rather than assuming a peer group, Lewellen
(2013) hand-collects the peers that rms report as their primary product market competitors
in their 10-K lings, and nds evidence for RPE. DeAngelis and Grinstein (2016) examine
the actual terms of compensation contracts and nd that 88% of RPE contracts measure the
rank performance of the CEO relative to peers. In contrast, most empirical studies measure
the di¤erence between rm performance and a peer-rm benchmark, implicitly assuming that
contracts concern absolute peer-adjusted performance. Using a rank-based specication, they
nd signicant evidence of RPE. However, while recent evidence suggests that RPE is not rare,
it is still far less common than the universality that frictionless models would predict.
In addition to signals about peer performance, the informativeness principle implies that
any informative signal, no matter how noisy, should be in the optimal contract. In reality,
in addition to rm value, CEO pay may depend on accounting performance measures (such
as sales growth, return-on-assets, and earnings per share growth) through their impact on
discretionary bonuses, performance-based vesting provisions (Bettis, Bizjak, Coles, and Kalpa-
thy (2010)), and subjective evaluations by principals (e.g. Cornelli, Kominek, and Ljungqvist
(2013)). However, CEO pay does not appear to depend on non-accounting performance mea-
sures such as surveys on intangible assets (e.g. customer satisfaction, brand strength, and
employee engagement) and the number of patent citations. These all potentially provide in-
formation over and above that contained in the stock price, since the stock market does not
immediately capitalize intangibles.
3.7. Risk-Taking
Thus far, the CEO takes an action that changes the rms expected value, but has no direct
e¤ect on its risk. In Smith and Stulz (1985), the agent takes a single action that reduces risk
via hedging. If the agent is risk averse, he will engage in excessive hedging; in an CEO context,
this corresponds to turning down positive-NPV risky projects. They show how options address
this issue, since their convexity counterbalances the concavity of the agents utility function.
Dittmann, Yu, and Zhang (2015) calibrate a model where the CEO chooses both e¤ort and risk,
and show that it can explain the mix of stock and options found empirically. However, Carpenter
(2000) and Ross (2004) show theoretically that options may not increase the managers risk-
taking incentives: while an option has vega (positive sensitivity to volatility), it also has
delta (positive sensitivity to rm value). This, a risk-averse manager may wish to reduce
volatility in the value of the rm and thus his options. Shue and Townsend (2014) evaluate this
theoretical debate empirically by showing that exogenous increases in options, resulting from
their multi-year grant cycles, lead to an increase in risk-taking.
The above models consider goodrisk-taking that improves rm value. However, the CEO
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may also have incentives to engage in badrisk-taking that reduces rm value. In particular, in
a levered rm, an equity-aligned manager may undertake a project even if it is negative-NPV,
because shareholders benet from the upside but have limited downside risk due to limited
liability (Jensen and Meckling (1976)). Anticipating this, creditors will demand a high cost of
debt and/or tight covenants, to the detriment of shareholders.
Edmans and Liu (2010) show that a potential solution to such risk-shifting is to compensate
the CEO with debt as well as equity. Such debt is referred to as insidedebt, as it is owned
by the manager rather than outside creditors. Previously proposed remedies for risk-shifting
include bonuses for achieving solvency, or salaries and private benets that are forfeited in
bankruptcy (e.g. Brander and Poitevin (1992)). These instruments are sensitive to the incidence
of bankruptcy, but if bankruptcy occurs, they pay zero regardless of liquidation value. In
contrast, inside debt yields a positive payo¤ in bankruptcy, proportional to the recovery value.
Thus it renders the manager sensitive to rm value in bankruptcy, and not just the incidence
of bankruptcy exactly as desired by creditors and thus reduce the cost of raising debt, to
the benet of shareholders. Indeed, recent empirical studies have shown that CEOs hold a
substantial amount of inside debt through dened benet pensions and deferred compensation.
These are unsecured obligations which yield an equal claim with other creditors in bankruptcy,
and thus constitute inside debt. For example, Sundaram and Yermack (2007) show that GEs
Jack Welch had over $100 million of inside debt when he retired in 2001.
Since traditional contracting theories typically advocate only the use of equity, and disclosure
of pensions and especially deferred compensation was limited prior to a 2007 SEC disclosure
reform, Bebchuk and Fried (2004) argue that inside debt constitutes stealth compensation
through retirement benets. However, the risk deterrence story suggests that inside debt
can be consistent with optimal contracting. The disclosure of signicant inside debt positions
following the SEC reform led to an increase in bond prices (Wei and Yermack (2011)), and
is associated with lower bond yields and fewer covenants (Anantharaman, Fang, and Gong
(2014), using personal state income taxes as an instrument for inside debt). Debt-aligned
executives manage the rm more conservatively as measured by the rms lower distance to
default (Sundaram and Yermack (2007)), and lower stock return volatility, R&D expenditures
and nancial leverage (Cassell, Huang, Sanchez, and Stuart (2012), also using the income tax
instrument). Indeed, the alignment of executives with debt has gathered pace in the recent
crisis. In 2010, American International Group tied 80% of highly paid employeespay to the
price of its bonds, and 20% to the price of its stock, and UBS and Credit Suisse have since
started paying bonuses in bonds. The Liikanen Report of the European Commission and the
Federal Reserve have advocated debt-like compensation to curb excessive risk-taking. However,
even if the above studies can be interpreted as showing causal e¤ects of inside debt on risk-
taking and borrowing conditions, they do not study whether shareholders benet overall, nor
whether alternative solutions to risk-shifting would be superior.
In Smith and Stulz (1985), the rm is unlevered so there are no risk-shifting concerns; the
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contract contains options but no debt. In Edmans and Liu (2010), the CEO is risk-neutral
so there is no problem of inducing him to take good risk; the contract contains debt, but
not options. For future research, it would be interesting to incorporate both leverage and risk
aversion into a model of both e¤ort and risk-taking, to study the optimal mix of salary, stock,
options, and debt.
4. Dynamic Incentives
This section analyzes dynamic models of moral hazard. In reality, CEOs are employed for
several years. A dynamic setting leads to additional questions, such as how to spread the
rewards for good performance over time, how the level and sensitivity of pay vary over time,
and when the CEO quits or is red. We start in Section 4.1 with a tractable discrete-time model
that yields closed-form solutions, at the cost of some assumptions. In Section 4.2 we move to
a continuous-time model which typically yields numerical solutions, but allows for departures
and terminations.
4.1. Dynamic Incentives: A Simple Discrete Time Model
We present here the discrete-time version of the Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov (2012)
model, which uses the EG framework to yield tractable solutions. In every period t, the CEO
takes rst observes noise "t and then takes action at, which a¤ects terminal (period-T ) rm
value as follows
VT = Se
PT
s=1(as+"s):
We assume that a signal about it, Vt = Se
Pt
s=1(as+"s), is contractible. The incremental infor-
mation contained in Vt over and above that contained in Vt 1 can be summarized by the stock
return
rt = lnVt   lnVt 1 = at + "t
where, as in EG, the CEO observes the noise "t before he takes his action at. Also in every
period t, the principal pays the CEO yt (r1; :::; rt) which may depend on the entire history of
returns. The agent consumes ct and saves (yt   ct) (which may be positive or negative) at the
continuously compounded risk-free rate R. We consider two versions of the model. In one,
private saving is observed by the principal and so she can stipulate that yt = ct, i.e. that
the CEO does not engage in private saving. In another, private saving is unobserved. This
leads to additional complications, since the CEO may have incentives to engage in a joint
deviation of simultaneously shirking and saving by saving, he insures against future income
shocks, thus reducing e¤ort incentives. Simply put, by privately saving, the CEO can achieve
a di¤erent consumption prole ct from the income yt provided by the contract, thus undoing
e¤ort incentives. The contract must therefore remove his incentives to do so.
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The CEO lives for T periods and retires after period L  T .20 His lifetime utility is:
U =
TX
t=1
e tu (ct; at) ; u (c; a) = ln c  g(a) (56)
where  is the agents discount rate, i.e. his impatience. His per-period utility function u (c; a) =
ln c   g (a) corresponds to (10) with v (c) = ln c and u (x) = x, i.e. multiplicative preferences.
The agents reservation utility is w.
The principal is risk-neutral and so her objective function is expected discounted terminal
rm value, minus expected pay:
max
(at;t=1;:::L);(yt;t=1;:::T )
E
"
e RTVT  
TX
t=1
e Rtyt
#
. (57)
She wishes to implement a target action sequence (at ).
There are two constraints to consider. The rst is the e¤ort constraint (EF), which ensures
that the CEO does not wish to deviate from (at ). We consider a local deviation in the action
at after history (r1; : : : rt 1; "t): The e¤ect on CEO utility should be zero:
0 = Et

@U
@rt
@rt
@at
+
@U
@at

:
Since @rt=@at = 1 and @U=@at = e tua (ct; at), the EF constraint (evaluated at at = at ) is
EF : Et

@U
@rt

= e tua (ct; at ) if a

t 2 (0; a) (58)
Et

@U
@rt

 e tua (ct; at ) if at = a
for t  L.
The second constraint is the private savings constraint (PS), which ensures that the CEO
consumes his income in period t, i.e. ct = yt, so that he has no incentive to save privately. If
the CEO saves a small amount dt in period t and invests it until t + 1; his utility increases to
the leading order by  Et
h
@U
@ct
i
dt + Et
h
@U
@ct+1
i
eRdt. To deter private saving or borrowing, this
change should be zero to the leading order,
PS : 1 = Et

eR 
uc(ct+1; at+1)
uc(ct; at)

; (59)
that is, the consumption Euler equation should hold. If the CEO cannot engage in private saving
(e.g. because the principal can observe saving), then instead the inverse Euler equation (IEE)
20In the model, the principal replaces the CEO with a new one and continues to contract optimally, but this
assumption can easily be weakened.
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holds, as is standard in agency problems with additively separable utility (e.g. Rogerson (1985)
and Farhi and Werning (2012)). This is given by
IEE : 1 = Et

1
eR 
uc(ct; at)
uc(ct+1; at+1)

(60)
We next present the solution (a heuristic proof is in Appendix A). For simplicity, we assume
a constant target action (at = a
, which may correspond to full productive e¢ ciency a). The
contract is given by:
ln ct = ln c0 +
tX
s=1
(srs + ks) ; (61)
where s and ks are constants. The sensitivity s is given by
s =
(
g0(a)
1+e+:::+e(T s) for s  L;
0 for s > L:
(62)
If private saving is impossible, the constant ks ensures that the IEE (60) holds:
ks = R  lnE

es(a
+")
s

: (63)
If private saving is possible, ks ensures that the PS constraint (64) holds:
ks = R + lnE

e s(a
+")
s

(64)
The closed-form solutions allow transparent economic implications. Equation (61) shows
that time-t income should be linked to the return not only in period t, but also in all previous
periods. Therefore, increases in rt boost log pay in the current and all future periods equally.
Since the CEO is risk-averse, it is e¢ cient to reward for good performance over the future to
achieve consumption smoothing: the deferred rewardprinciple. This result was rst derived
by Lambert (1983) and Rogerson (1985), who consider a two-period model where the agent
only chooses e¤ort.
We now consider how contract sensitivity changes over time. Equation (62) shows that, in
an innite-horizon model (T !1), the sensitivity is constant and given by
t =  =
 
1  e  g0 (a) : (65)
This is intuitive: the contract must be su¢ ciently sharp to compensate for the disutility of
e¤ort, which is constant. The sensitivity to the current-period return is decreasing in the
discount rate if the CEO is more impatient (higher ), it is necessary to reward him today
more than in the future.
If T is nite, equation (62) shows that t is increasing over time: the increasing incentives
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principle. When there are fewer periods over which to spread the reward for e¤ort, the current-
period reward (@ut=@at = t) must increase to keep the lifetime increase in utility @U=@at
constant. Other moral hazard models predict increasing incentives through di¤erent channels.
Gibbons and Murphy (1992) generate an increasing current sensitivity because the lifetime
increase in utility @U=@at rises over time to o¤set falling career concerns. In Garrett and Pavan
(2015), the current sensitivity rises over time because @U=@at increases to minimize the agents
informational rents. Here, @U=@at is constant since we have no adverse selection or career
concerns; instead, the increase in @ut=@at stems from the reduction in consumption smoothing
possibilities as the CEO approaches retirement.
While t depends on the model horizon, it is independent of whether private saving is
possible this possibility only a¤ects kt. Since private saving does not a¤ect the agents action
and thus rm returns, the sensitivity of pay to returns is unchanged. From (61), the possibility
of private saving alters the time trend in the level of pay. The log expected growth rate in pay
is lnE [ct=ct 1] = kt + lnE

etrt

.
If private saving is impossible, substituting for kt using (63) yields
lnE

ct
ct 1

= R  ,
which is constant over time. If and only if the CEO is more patient than the aggregate economy
( < R), then the growth rate is positive, as is intuitive. If private saving is possible, (64) yields
lnE

ct
ct 1

= R   + lnE[e trt ] + lnE[etrt ]:
In the limit of small time intervals (or, equivalently, in the limit of small variance of noise 2),
this yields
lnE

ct
ct 1

= R   + 2t 2t :
Thus, the growth rate of consumption is always higher when private saving is possible. This
faster upward trend means that the contract e¤ectively saves for the agent, removing the need
for him to do so himself. This result is consistent with He (2012), who nds that the optimal
contract under private saving involves a wage pattern that is non-decreasing over time.21 The
model thus predicts a positive relationship between pay and tenure, consistent with the common
practice of seniority-based pay. Moreover, the growth rate depends on the risk to which the
CEO is exposed, which is in turn driven by his incentives  and rm volatility . This is
intuitive: greater risk increases the CEOs motive to engage in precautionary saving (since,
with CRRA utility, u000 (c) > 0), and so a rapidly-rising level of pay is necessary to remove the
21Lazear (1979) has a back-loaded wage pattern for incentive, rather than private saving considerations (the
agent is risk-neutral in his model). Since the agent wishes to ensure he receives the high future payments, he
induces e¤ort to avoid being red. Similarly, in Yang (2009), a back-loaded wage pattern induces agents to
work to avoid the rm being shut down.
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need for him to save privately. Furthermore, in a nite-horizon model, t is increasing over time
and so the growth rate of consumption rises with tenure, that is, pay accelerates over time.
To illustrate the economic forces behind the contract, we now present a simple numerical
example with T = 3, L = 3,  = 0, at = a
, and g0 (a) = 1. From (62), the contract is:
ln c1 =
r1
3
+ 1;
ln c2 =
r1
3
+
r2
2
+ 2;
ln c3 =
r1
3
+
r2
2
+
r3
1
+ 3;
where t =
Pt
s=1 ks. An increase in r1 leads to a permanent increase in log consumption it
rises by r1
3
in all future periods. In addition, the sensitivity @ut=@at increases over time, from
1=3 to 1=2 to 1=1. The total lifetime reward for e¤ort @Ut=@at is a constant 1 in all periods.
We now consider T = 5, so that the CEO lives after retirement. The contract is now
ln c1 =
r1
5
+ 1; (66)
ln c2 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+ 2;
ln c3 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+
r3
3
+ 3;
ln c4 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+
r3
3
+ 4;
ln c5 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+
r3
3
+ 5:
Since the CEO takes no action from t = 4, his pay does not depend on r4 or r5. However, it
depends on r1, r2, and r3 as his earlier e¤orts a¤ect his wealth, from which he consumes.
Short-Termism We nally extend the basic model to allow the agent to engage in short-
termism, and study how this possibility a¤ects the optimal contract. Short-termism is broadly
dened to encompass any action that increases current returns at the expense of future returns
scrapping positive-NPV investments (see, for example, Stein (1988)) or taking negative-NPV
projects that generate an immediate return but weaken long-run value (such as sub-prime
lending), earnings management, and accounting manipulation.
At time t, in addition into an e¤ort and savings decision, the manager can also take a myopic
actionmt;i that increases the current return to r0t = rt+Mi (mt;i) whereMi is a concave function.
The CEO also chooses a release lag i, which is the number of periods before the negative
consequences of myopia become evident. The maximum possible release lag is H  T   L.
Myopia at t with release lag i reduces the return at t+ i to r0t+i = rt+i  mt;i, and leaves other
returns unchanged (r0t+s = rt+s for s 6= 0; i). Let Mi = M 0i (0) 2 [0; 1) denote the marginal
e¢ ciency of manipulation at release lag i.
If the rm is su¢ ciently large, the principal will wish to implement zero manipulation, i.e.
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mt;i = 0 8 t. If the agent engages in a small myopic action mt;i  0 at time t, his utility changes
to the leading order by
Et

@U
@rt

Mmt;i   Et

@U
@rt+i

mt;i:
This should be weakly negative for all small mt;i  0. Hence, we obtain an additional No
Manipulation (NM) constraint:
NM : Et

@U
@rt

Mi  Et

@U
@rt+i

(67)
for t  L: The optimal contract is now as above, with the additional constraint (67).
We apply this constraint to the 5-period model of equation (66), with H = 1. The optimal
contract now changes to:
ln c1 =
r1
5
+ 1; (68)
ln c2 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+ 2;
ln c3 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+
r3
3
+ 3;
ln c4 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+
r3
3
+
M1r4
2
+ 4;
ln c5 =
r1
5
+
r2
4
+
r3
3
+
M1r4
2
+ 5:
Even though the CEO retires at the end of t = 3, his income depends on r4, otherwise
he would have an incentive to boost r3 at the expense of r4. Thus, the CEO should retain
equity in the rm even after retirement. For a general maximum release lag of H, the CEO
should be sensitive to rm returns until period L+H, i.e. retain equity in the rm for H years
after retirement. This result formalizes the verbal argument of Bebchuk and Fried (2004),
who advocate escrowing the CEOs equity to deter him from inating the stock price before
retirement and then cashing out. For example, Angelo Mozilo, the former CEO of Countrywide
Financial, made $129 million from stock sales in the 12 months prior to the start of the subprime
crisis. Indeed, in the aftermath of the crisis, banks such as Goldman Sachs and UBS have been
increasing vesting horizons. An alternative remedy proposed is to use clawbacks, i.e. pay
executives bonuses for good short-term performance, but rescind them if the performance ends
up being reversed in the long-term. However, the legality of such clawbacks is unclear, and even
if legally possible, they may be costly to implement. Lengthening the vesting period of equity
so that rewards are not paid out prematurely in the rst place may be a superior solution.
The sensitivity to r4 depends on the ine¢ ciency of earnings inationM1; in the extreme,
if M1 = 0, myopia is impossible and so there is no need to expose the CEO to returns after
retirement. The contract is unchanged for t  3, that is, for the periods in which the CEO
works. Even under the original contract, there is no incentive to inate earnings at t = 1 or
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t = 2 because there is no discounting, and so the negative e¤ect of myopia on future returns
reduces the CEOs lifetime utility by more than the positive e¤ect on current returns increases
it. With discounting, incentives increase even faster over time than in the absence of a myopia
problem. The higher sensitivity to future returns ensures that myopia causes the CEO to lose
enough in the future to counterbalance the e¤ect of discounting.
The contracts in (66) and (68) can be implemented in a simple manner. Each year, the
managers annual pay is escrowed into an Incentive Account, a proportion t of which is
invested in stock and the remainder in cash, so his %-% incentives equal t given by (62). If
the stock price declines, so that the fraction of stock falls below t, cash in the account is used
to buy stock to replenish his incentives. Every year, a fraction of the account vests and is paid
to the manager, but the remainder remains escrowed to deter myopia. Zhu (2014) shows that
bonus banks, introduced in practice by the consulting rm Stern Stewart, are a similar way
to deter myopia. Bonuses for short-term performance are deposited into the bonus bank,
rather than immediately paid to the manager, and only a fraction is paid each period. Poor
performance in one period, which may be caused by a myopic action in a previous period, wipes
out previously accrued bonuses.
The advantage of the above framework is that it yields closed-form solutions that make the
economic intuition transparent. However, it comes at the cost of a number of assumptions.
First, as in the EG model, it assumes a xed target action and that the noise precedes the
action, which may be reasonable in some settings but not others. Second, it assumes a xed
retirement date T and does not allow for quits or rings beforehand, which is an important
limitation in a CEO setting.
4.2. Dynamic Incentives in Continuous Time
This section presents the continuous-time model of Sannikov (2008) which allows for quits and
rings, as well as the implemented e¤ort level to be endogenized. At every instant t, the agent
takes action at and consumes ct; the framework rules out private saving so we do not distinguish
between income and consumption. His expected lifetime utility at date t is
Ut = Et
Z 1
t
e (s t)u (cs; as) ds

: (69)
It is the promised utilitythat the agent will obtain if he exerts the path of e¤orts recommended
by the principal. This path of e¤orts is given by an adapted process (at ). Recall that an adapted
process is a process whose value depends on the information available at time t.
The principal uses the same discount rate , and her expected utility is:
Qt = Et
Z 1
t
e (s t) (dVs   csds)

; (70)
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where dVt instantaneous prot (before paying the CEO), assumed to be:
dVt = atdt+ dZt. (71)
where Zt is a standard Brownian motion.
To derive the optimal contract, we rst recall two basic lemmas from stochastic calculus,
proven in Appendix A.
Martingale representation theorem. If Ut = Et
R1
t
e (s t)Ksds

for some adapted process
Kt, then
dUt = ( Kt + Ut) dt+ tdZt; (72)
where t is some other adapted process.
Hamilton-Jacobi Bellman (HJB) equation. Consider a stochastic process xt following
dxt =  (xt; Ct) dt +  (xt; Ct) dZt, where Ct is a control variable (which is potentially multidi-
mensional), and the following optimal control problem:
Q (x) = sup
(Cs)st
Et
Z 1
t
e (s t)f (xs; Cs) ds j xt = x

where control Ct is adapted, i.e. uses only information available at t. Then the value function
Q () satises:
0 = sup
C
f (x;C)  Q (x) +Q0 (x) (x;C) + 1
2
Q00 (x)2 (x;C) (73)
Using the martingale representation theorem (72), the agents utility process (69) can be
written:
dUt = ( u (ct; at) + Ut) dt+ tdZt
for some process t that represents the sensitivity of the contract (equation (72) yields a process
t, and we set t = t=).
This allows us to write the contract. Call at the time-t action recommended by the principal
(it also depends on the past, and will soon be optimized upon). On the equilibrium path,
dVt = a

tdt+ dZt, so utility follows:
dUt = ( u (ct; at ) + Ut) dt+ t (dVt   atdt) : (74)
This equation denes an essential part of the contract: given the past (summarized by the
promised utility Ut), the contract recommends action at , and given the surprisedVt   atdt,
the contract specics how promised utility changes: by dUt given in (74). Here (74) features the
recommended action at (which the principal species) rather than the actual action at (which
the principal does not observe).
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The intuition is as follows. Ut represents an accountwhich contains the lifetime utility
promised to the agent. If the principal provides instantaneous utility to the agent, the account
falls by  u (ct; at ) as less utility is owed in the future. If rm value is higher than expected
(dVt   atdt > 0), the account rises in value. Otherwise, it grows at a rate  (the Ut term).
We now move to the agents IC. If the agent chooses action at, his utility is
max
at
u (ct; at) dt+ dUt (at)
i.e., he receives u (ct; at) today, and will receive continuation utility of dUt (at) later. Given (71)
and (74), we have
dUt = tatdt+ terms independent of at,
which yields the IC
at 2 arg max
a
u (ct; at) + tat:
The rst-order condition yields:
t =  ua (ct; at) , (75)
i.e. incentives t are determined by ct and at .
Turning to the principals problem, the state variable for the HJB stochastic process is
xt = Ut, the agents promised utility. The principals value function is Q (xt). Using (75), the
HJB equation (73) is, for all x,
0 = max
c;a
a  c  Q (x) +Q0 (x) [ u (c; a) + x] + 1
2
Q00 (x) ua (c; a)
2 2; (76)
This gives an ordinary di¤erential equation for Q (x). From this, the optimal c and a are
implicitly determined by:
 1 Q0 (x) uc (c; a) + 1
2
Q00 (x) @c
 
ua (c; a)
22 = 0 (77)
1 Q0 (x) ua (c; a) + 1
2
Q00 (x) @a
 
ua (c; a)
22 = 0: (78)
We now need to specify the boundary conditions. The agents per-period reservation utility
is w, and so he accepts the contract only if Ut  w=. Let Q0 (x) =  u (; 0) 1 (w) =V + A
denote the cost of providing this to agent when the agent exerts zero e¤ort, where A is the
present value of the principals outside option, e.g. his surplus from hiring a new agent. The
agent is employed if and only if his promised utility is x 2 [xL; xH ], with the following matching
and smooth pasting conditions:
Q (x) = Q0 (x) ; Q
0 (x) = Q00 (x) for x = xL; xH : (79)
Hence, the problem is characterized by the ODE (76), xL, and xH . At xL, the agent is ter-
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minated because of poor performance. At xH , he is terminated because he has become too
expensive to incentivize. Intuitively, as the agents promised utility increases, his marginal
utility of money falls, and so it is harder to incentivize him.
We have four unknowns, xL; xH , and the two degrees of freedom associated with a second-
order ODE (given a value x, the ODE is described by two parameters, Q (x) and Q0 (x)).
We also have four equations (79). Hence, the problem yields a solution.
To sum up, the principal solves the problem as follows. Given her value function Q, she
nds the optimal action and consumption from the rst-order conditions (77) and (78). These
in turn determine the optimal incentives from (75), and the agents utility is given by (74).
This problem is quite complex, and typically the solutions are numerical.22 Here, we repro-
duce a result from Sannikov (2008):
Figure 1: Reproduction of Figure 1 in Sannikov (2008) with
parameters u(c) =
p
c; g(a) = 0:5a2 + 0:4a;  = 0:1;  = 1.
While the numerical results depend somewhat on the utility function, for the specication in
Figure 1, when promised utility rises, consumption increases. As a result, e¤ort falls: the mar-
ginal utility of additional consumption is low and so stronger monetary incentives are required
to induce e¤ort. Since the agent is now expensive to incentivize, the optimal e¤ort level falls.
Other variables have non-monotonic relationships with promised utility. One important open
22One closed-form solution is the one in the Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov (2012) setup, with a
constant a (e.g. a = aH) and no outside opportunity (w =  1). With log utility (u (c; a) = ln c   g (a))
and r = , the reader can verify that c (x) = Derx, Q (x) = Aerx + B for some constants A;B;D. With
constant relative risk aversion (u =
 
ce g(a)
1 
= (1  )), the solution has the form c = Dx1=(1 ); Q (x) =
Ax1=(1 ) + B. The resulting contracts are described in Section 4.1. Otherwise, the only known solutions are
numerical.
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question would be to take these theoretical models to the data, and determine which functional
form best describe the world. The absence of analytical solutions renders comparative statics
relatively di¢ cult to obtain. In many situations, greater risk aversion reduces incentives, for the
same intuition as Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) incentives are more costly as they require
the agent to be paid a greater risk premium.
Sannikovs (2008) methodology has since been used in executive compensation applications.
He (2012) extends the model to allowing for private saving. In standard models without private
saving (e.g. Rogerson (1985)), the optimal wage prole is front-loaded, but (as discussed
previously) such a prole will induce the agent to engage in a joint deviation of shirking and
saving. He shows that the wage prole is back-loaded, to deter such private saving. He also nds
that pay does not fall upon poor performance but exhibits a permanent rise after a su¢ ciently
good performance history. This downward rigidity is also predicted by Harris and Holmstrom
(1982), but through a quite di¤erent channel. Their model features two-sided learning about
the agents ability rather than moral hazard. Downward rigidity in wages insures the agent
against negative news about his ability, while wage rises after positive news ensure that he does
not quit.23
4.3. Empirical Analyses
We now turn to tests of the empirical predictions of dynamic models. Lambert (1983), Roger-
son (1985), and Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov (2012) predict the deferred reward
principle: rm performance should a¤ect future as well as current pay due to consumption
smoothing considerations. Indeed, Boschen and Smith (1995) show that rm performance has
a much greater e¤ect on the NPV of future pay than current pay. Gibbons and Murphy (1992)
nd support for the increasing incentives principle, that incentives rise over time, although
studying pay-performance sensitivity rather than wealth-performance sensitivity. This result
is consistent with both consumption smoothing possibilities and career concerns falling with
tenure. In addition to incentives, Murphy (1986) nds that pay increases over time, consistent
with models which predict a backward-loaded wage pattern to remove incentives for private
saving. However, to our knowledge, predictions that the growth rate in pay depends on the
level of incentives  and rm risk  are as yet untested. Turning to the e¤ects of short-termism,
Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov (2012) predict that rms in which the CEO has greater
scope to engage in myopia should have longer vesting periods and also more rapidly increasing
incentives over time. Consistent with the rst prediction, Gopalan, Milbourn, Song, and Thakor
(2014) nd that incentives have longer horizons in rms with more growth opportunities and
greater R&D intensity.
Turning to the predictions regarding termination, many models predict termination after
23DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) use the Sannikov (2008) framework to study optimal capital structure and
show that it can be implemented with standard securities a credit line, long-term debt, and outside equity.
Since the agent always holds equity, the model focuses on nancing rather than executive compensation.
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poor performance, to deter shirking ex ante, e.g. DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), DeMarzo
and Fishman (2007), Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007), and Sannikov (2008).24 In
particular, the rst three models feature limited liability, which reduces the principals ability to
punish poor performance nancially, thus leading to a role for termination. In some cases, such
as Sannikov (2008), termination also arises after very good performance as the agent becomes
too expensive to incentivize. However, historically, dismissals have been relatively rare. Murphy
and Zabojnik (2007) and Jensen and Murphy (2004) report turnover rates of 10% per year in
the 1970s and 1980s, which increased only to 11% in the 1990s. Taylors (2010) learning
model shows that the low rate of dismissals can only be justied if the costs to shareholders
of turnover exceed $200 million. Turning to turnover-performance sensitivity, Coughlan and
Schmidt (1985), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Warner, Watts, and Wruck (1988), and Weisbach
(1988) nd that turnover probability is decreasing in performance but the economic magnitude
is small. Jensen and Murphy (1990) estimate that a CEO who performs in line with the market
over 2 years has a 11.1% dismissal probability; underperforming by 50% in each year increases
this probability only to 17.5%. Thus, even under the aggressive assumption that the CEO
receives no severance package and is unable to nd alternative employment until retirement,
Jensen and Murphy (1990) estimate that incentives from dismissal are equivalent to an equity
stake of 0.03%.
Moreover, incentives from dismissal are even lower if the CEO is granted severance pay.
In contrast to most theories, which advocate that pay should be weakly monotonic in rm
performance, CEOs are often given severance packages upon departure. Yermack (2006) nds a
mean contracted severance pay of $0.9 million, with a mean discretionary amount of $4.5 million;
the respective maximums are $36.1 and $121.1 million, suggesting that these packages can be
substantial. Their usage is especially prevalent among dismissed CEOs compared to those who
voluntarily retire, and thus appears to reward CEOs for failure. However, a closer look at the
data suggests that the vast majority of severance paydoes not stem from compensation for
loss of employment, but instead items such as unvested restricted shares, unexercised stock
options, and accrued pension benets, which were promised and contractually obligated to the
CEO under any state of nature. For example, out of Henry McKinnells much-criticized $180m
severance package from Pzer, $78m was deferred compensation ($67m contributed plus $11m
interest), $82m was the present value of his pension plan, and $8m was from stock options.
Thus, only an incremental $11m was due to the loss of employment.25 Furthermore, some
theories predict that severance pay can be optimal. Almazan and Suarez (2003) show that it
can induce the CEO to leave voluntarily when a more able replacement is available; Inderst and
Mueller (2008) demonstrate that it can deter a CEO from entrenching himself by concealing
24Note that termination after poor performance is typically not subgame-perfect, so moral hazard models
assume that the rm can commit to terminate the CEO. Learning models predict subgame-perfect termination
after poor performance, as such performance signals low managerial quality (e.g. Jovanovic (1979), Taylor
(2010), and Garrett and Pavan (2012)).
25We thank David Yermack for this example.
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negative information that would lead to his dismissal. One example is to induce the CEO to
accept a takeover bid, which typically yields a substantial premium to shareholders. Manso
(2011) shows that severance pay is valuable to induce the CEO to explore new technologies
rather than merely exploit existing ones. In the aforementioned model of He (2012), severance
pay leads to a backward-loaded wage pattern that is robust to private savings.
Recent studies of CEO turnover have uncovered higher rates. Kaplan and Minton (2011) ag-
gregate both internal (board-driven) and external (through takeover and bankruptcy) turnover
and nd that total annual turnover was 17.4% over 1998-2005. A one standard-deviation fall
in the industry-adjusted stock return is associated with a 3.4% increase in the likelihood of
turnover. This gure is 2.1% for industry performance and 1.8% for the performance of the
overall market. Jenter and Lewellen (2014) nd a total turnover rate of 11.8% per year of
which they estimate 4.1-4.5 percentage points (35-38% of the total) are performance-induced,
i.e. would not have occurred had performance been good.
Thus, more recent evidence suggests that the threat of job loss from poor performance is
signicant. While these results support the prediction that ring occurs upon poor performance,
they do not support the prediction that it is also prompted by good performance. In addition,
moral hazard models typically do not yield quantitative predictions for what the rate of ring
or the sensitivity of ring to performance should be, making it di¢ cult to assess whether the
observed ndings are optimal.26
5. Open Questions
5.1. Apparent Ine¢ ciencies in Executive Compensation
Thus far, we have argued that many features of executive compensation that are frequently
criticized may yet be consistent with e¢ cient contracting. Examples include the level of pay,
low $-$ incentives, the negative relationship between incentives and rm size, the use of stock
rather than options, the lack of relative performance evaluation, and the use of severance
pay and inside debt. However, this empirical consistency does not prove that compensation
practices are e¢ cient. As discussed earlier, the positive correlation between pay and rm size is
also consistent with rent extraction, and may arise because a third omitted variable drives both;
similar concerns surround other empirical ndings consistent with shareholder value models.
In addition, even accepting the empirical correlations discussed in this paper as supportive
of shareholder value in general, there remain several features of compensation that could be
improved upon.
First, empirical studies uncover results for the average rm. However, even if compensation
is e¢ cient on average, there may still be several individual cases of rent extraction. For example,
26Taylor (2010) derives quantitative predictions for the rate of ring as a function of the cost of turnover to
shareholders, but in a learning model.
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while the theories discussed in Section 4.3 may be able to justify the mean level of severance
pay, their forces are unlikely to be strong enough to rationalize extreme realizations, such as
the maximum discretionary award of $121.1 million. In addition, while Dittmann, Maug, and
Spalt (2013) nd that indexation of options would not create value for the average rm, it
would for 25% of rms and so the absence of indexation across all rms is di¢ cult to reconcile
with e¢ ciency.
Second, some aspects of compensation are hidden from shareholders, which is di¢ cult to rec-
oncile with them being set in shareholdersinterest. For example, Lie (2005) presents evidence
that the positive stock returns after the disclosed grant dates of executive stock options, rst
documented by Yermack (1997), arises from backdating. Since options are typically granted
at the money, the CEO unbeknown to shareholders chooses the grant date in retrospect,
to coincide with days on which the stock price is low and thus justifying a low strike price.
Similarly, recent corporate scandals such as Tyco uncovered executives extracting perks that
were initially unknown to shareholders.
Third, current schemes often fail to keep pace with a rms changing conditions. While
Section 3.5 argues that the CEOs incentives are su¢ cient in normal times to induce e¤ort,
if a company encounters di¢ culties and its stock price falls, the delta of his options decline
and so they lose much of their incentive e¤ect. One remedy used in practice is the repricing
of out-of-the-money options (Brenner, Sundaram, and Yermack (2000); Acharya, John, and
Sundaram (2000)), but this is controversial as it appears to reward the CEO for failure. Even
if the CEO is paid purely with stock (which always has a delta of 1), the problem continues
to exist as long as the benet of e¤ort b (S) is increasing in rm size. Intuitively, when rm
size falls, the benets from e¤ort are lower and so additional equity is needed to induce a given
level of e¤ort. For example, if both the production and utility functions are multiplicative, the
relevant measure is %-% incentives, the percentage of the CEOs wealth that is comprised of
stock, and this measure falls when the stock price declines. If the utility function is additive,
the relevant measure is $-% incentives, the dollar value of the CEOs equity, which also falls
when the stock price declines. A simple way to replenish incentives is to increase (reduce) the
portion of the CEOs salary that is given in equity (cash) after the stock price falls; indeed,
Core and Guay (1999) show that rms use new equity grants to move executives towards their
optimal incentive levels. Alternatively, the Incentive Account discussed in Section 4.1 involves
rebalancing the amount of the CEOs escrowed equity and deferred cash to ensure he always has
su¢ cient equity. Critically, in both cases, unlike the repricing of options, the CEOs additional
equity is not given for free: it is paid for by a reduction in cash. Thus, the CEO is reincentivized
without him being rewarded for failure.
Fourth, standard measures of CEO incentives, such as those considered in Section 3, only
measure how the CEOs wealth is a¤ected by changes to the current stock price. They do not
consider the extent to which the CEO is also aligned with the long-term stock price, i.e. the
horizon of incentives. The classic managerial myopia models of Stein (1988, 1989) show that
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short-term incentives can lead to myopic actions. In a corporate context, these actions can
involve cutting R&D, reducing employee training, writing loans that may become delinquent
in the future, or expending corporate resources on earnings management. Empirical studies of
the horizon of incentives have been hindered by lack of data availability on the vesting period
of an executives equity, but recent studies suggest that horizons may a¤ect behavior. Gopalan,
Milbourn, Song, and Thakor (2014) use the recent change in disclosure requirements to pioneer
a measure of the durationof incentives, analogous to the duration of a debt security. Shorter
duration incentives are correlated with earnings management. Edmans, Fang, and Lewellen
(2015) study the quantity of equity scheduled to vest in a given year, since this amount depends
on equity grants made several years prior and is thus likely exogenous to current investment
opportunities. They nd that vesting equity is signicantly correlated with cuts in R&D and
capital expenditure growth, positive analyst forecast revisions, positive earnings guidance, and a
greater likelihood that the rm announces earnings that beat analyst forecasts by a narrow (but
not wide) margin. Johnson, Ryan, and Tian (2009) show that unrestricted stock is positively
correlated with corporate fraud.
One potential solution to the potential negative consequences of short horizons is to extend
the vesting period of equity. While the current debates surround the level of pay and the
sensitivity of pay to performance, extending the horizon of incentives may be particularly
valuable in overcoming moral hazard. However, lengthening vesting periods is not costless.
First, doing so will potentially expose the CEO to risk outside his control. Second, Laux (2012)
shows theoretically that, if the CEO forfeits unvested equity upon dismissal, he may engage in
myopic actions to avoid the risk of dismissal until his equity has vested. Third, Brisley (2006)
demonstrates that unvested equity ties up a signicant portion of the CEOs wealth within the
rm, and thus may cause him to turn down risky, value-creating projects.
We note that most of the potential remedies indexation (where valuable), a crackdown on
perks, updating contracts, and lengthening vesting periods can be implemented by sharehold-
ers (or shareholder-aligned boards) themselves, without the need for regulatory intervention.
The issue with regulation is that it is one-size-ts-all and cannot be adapted to a rms partic-
ular circumstances. For example, a minimum vesting horizon of (say) 5 years for equity may be
too short to induce investment in growth industries, and too long (thus subjecting the CEO to
excessive risk) in mature industries. Indeed, Gopalan, Milbourn, Song and Thakor (2014) nd
that equity duration is longer in rms with higher growth opportunities, long-term assets,
and R&D intensity, suggesting that the optimal vesting period varies according to rm charac-
teristics. The recent increases in disclosure requirements, and say-on-pay legislation, are steps
in the direction of allowing shareholders to ensure the optimality of contracts, as both give the
information and ability to decide whether a given pay package is appropriate in a particular
context.
Moreover, any policy to reform executive pay should not focus narrowly on compensation
alone, but recognize the systemic nature of the issue. Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006)
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show that shareholders who wish to maximize the short-term stock price may deliberately
induce myopia by voting for short-term CEO contracts. Thus, passing say-on-pay legislation
alone may not improve value creation if shareholders do not have the incentives to set pay
optimally. Reorienting shareholders to focus on long-term value is critical for ensuring that
greater shareholder power does indeed lead improvements in executive contracts. One potential
channel is to encourage shareholders to take large stakes (e.g. through superior liquidity, or
fewer disclosure requirements), since large shareholders have su¢ cient incentives to gather
information on the rms long-run value, rather than relying on public information such as
short-term prot (Edmans (2009)).
Regulatory intervention is, however, valuable if externalities exist. In Bénabou and Tirole
(2016), competition causes rms to o¤er high incentives to screen for high-ability managers.
However, strong incentives also lead to managers focusing excessively on measurable tasks and
shirking on unmeasurable tasks, echoing Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991). Acharya and Volpin
(2010) and Dicks (2012) show that competition can lead to spillover e¤ects: if one rm overpays
its workers (e.g. due to poor corporate governance), this will lead to other rms optimally doing
so to remain competitive, even if they are well-governed. How quantitatively important these
possible externalities remains an open question.
5.2. Underexplored Areas
5.2.1. Empirical Questions
We start with potential avenues for future empirical analysis, before turning to ideas for theoret-
ical research. There have been several high-impact empirical studies of executive compensation.
Since the debate about the e¢ ciency of pay concerns magnitudes, this is a eld in which de-
scriptive statistics alone are illuminating, for example Jensen and Murphys (1990) and Hall
and Liebmans (1998) seminal work on quantifying CEO incentives. Other studies have cor-
related CEO pay with outcomes such as rm value (e.g. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988),
McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia (1999)). However, as-
signing causality is very di¢ cult, as there are very few instruments for CEO incentives. Even
the very basic question of whether CEO incentives positively a¤ect rm value has not yet been
satisfactorily answered. Thus, a rst open question is to nd good instruments for or quasi-
exogenous shocks to CEO pay, to allow identication of the e¤ects of incentives. There have
been a limited number of attempts in this direction. Palia (2001) argues that CEO experience,
education, and age, and rm volatility are instruments for executive compensation. Core and
Larcker (2002) study increases in stock ownership mandated by CEOs approaching the mini-
mum levels set by pre-announced guidelines. Shue and Townsend (2013) exploit the fact that
options are granted according to multi-year cycles as an instrument for option grants. Edmans,
Fang, and Lewellen (2016) and Edmans, Goncalves-Pinto, Groen-Xu, and Wang (2016) analyze
the scheduled vesting of equity resulting from grants made several years prior.
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Second, most empirical studies have been focused on public rms in the U.S., given the
availability of the ExecuComp dataset. Research on compensation practices in private rms
would be particularly useful. Since private rms are likely closer to the e¢ cient benchmark, due
to the presence of a concentrated shareholder, such data would allow a comparison with similar
public rms to assess whether pay in public rms represents rent extraction. For example,
Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach (2013) study rms transitioning from public to private ownership.
Additional studies investigating private rms in general (in addition to those that were formerly
public) would be helpful. Another fruitful direction would be to study international data and
analyze the determinants of cross-country di¤erences in CEO pay. Conyon, Core, and Guay
(2011) and Fernandes, Ferreira, Matos, and Murphy (2013) are useful steps in this direction.
Moreover, while data on CEO wealth (an important determinant of both risk aversion and the
private benets from shirking) is typically unavailable in the U.S., it is sometimes available in
other countries (see, e.g., Becker (2006)).
Third, structurally estimating a dynamic moral hazard model may allow us to study ques-
tions that are di¢ cult to answer with reduced-form approaches. For example, it may allow
us to quantify several important determinants of the optimal contract that are otherwise dif-
cult to measure empirically, such as the CEOs risk aversion, cost of e¤ort, ability to engage
in manipulation, and desire for consumption smoothing.27 Relatedly, it can permit counter-
factual analyses such as the e¤ect on rm value of changes in these parameters, or how the
possibility of myopia or short-termism changes the contract. In addition, formal joint tests of
a theorys quantitative predictions can highlight where the theory fails, thus opening doors to
future research.
As examples of structural approaches, Gayle and Miller (2009) study the extent to which
moral hazard can explain the rise in CEO pay. Margiotta and Miller (2000), who nd that rms
would su¤er large losses from not contracting optimally and also estimate the gains that would
arise in a rst-best world where e¤ort were observable. In addition, managers only require a
small risk premium for the risk imposed by incentives the benets of incentives substantially
outweigh the costs. Gayle and Miller (2015) show that moral hazard models in which managers
can manipulate accounting reports better explain observed contracts than ones in which they
cannot, and Gayle, Golan, and Miller (2015) decompose the sources of pay di¤erences between
large and small rms. Pan (2016) extends the Gabaix and Landier (2008) assignment model,
which matches CEO talent with rm size, to incorporate additional dimensions of heterogene-
ity for example, more diversied rms hire CEOs with more cross-industry experience and
research-intensive rms hire CEOs who are more prone to innovation and estimates the im-
portance of match specicity for productivity. Page (2011) quantitatively estimates the e¤ect of
increasing CEO ownership on rm value. Using a learning model, Taylor (2010) estimates the
cost of ring that would rationalize observed turnover rates; a similar approach may uncover
27Dupuy and Galichon (2014) advance the modeling and econometrics of multi-dimensional matching models.
Techniques such as theirs could be useful in executive compensation.
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whether ring rates are optimal from a moral hazard perspective. Similarly, while existing tests
of the rent extraction vs. shareholder value hypotheses typically study the cross-section, an
analysis of time-series dynamics would allow us to study whether the evolution of pay over time
is consistent with shareholder value.
Fourth, and relatedly, modern dynamic contracting models have generated new empirical
predictions that can be tested using a reduced-form approach. Examples include how the level
of pay evolves over time and whether this wage growth is increasing in incentives and rm risk,
how incentives change over time, and the determinants of the optimal horizon of incentives.
Fifth, while empirical studies have identied a number of determinants for both the level of
pay and incentives, there are signicant managerial xed e¤ects in both (Graham, Li, and Qiu
(2012), Coles and Li (2013)) suggesting that a large component remains unexplained. These
xed e¤ects may result from talent, ability to extract rent, preferences, or other characteristics.
In addition, these studies assume separability of the unobserved xed e¤ect and the other
determinants. However, there may be interactions between them for example, part of the
xed e¤ect may result from talent, and the impact of talent on pay may depend on rm size.
Future research can lead to a better understanding of what these unobservable xed e¤ects may
represent, and how their e¤ect may vary with other characteristics already known to a¤ect pay.
5.2.2. Theoretical Questions
We now move to open theoretical questions. First, most current market equilibrium models
are static. It would be useful to add a dynamic moral hazard problem where incentives can
be provided not only through contracts, but also by the threat of ring.28 This will also
allow us to understand what causes CEOs to move between rms. Moreover, the possibility of
turnover adds complications to a standard dynamic model of moral hazard. The classic models
of Lambert (1983) and Rogerson (1985) predict that the reduction in CEO pay caused by poor
performance should be spread out over all future periods, to optimize risk sharing. However, the
CEO may quit if future expected pay is low, reducing consumption smoothing possibilities.29
Second, while the rent extractionview has been inuential, these arguments have been
mainly stated verbally, e.g. Bebchuk and Fried (2004). It would be particularly useful to model
the rent extraction view and compare its predictions to the data. One example is Kuhnen and
Zwiebel (2009), where the manager has freedom to extract perks, but doing so reduces prots
and thus shareholdersassessment of the managers ability, which may lead to him being red.
The model predicts that perk consumption is increasing in production uncertainty (since it is
easier to disguise low prots as resulting from a negative shock) and the managers outside
option (since ring is less of a concern). It is decreasing in uncertainty about the managers
ability, as then prots have a greater e¤ect on shareholdersassessment of his ability and thus
28See Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) for a market equilibrium model with CEO turnover without moral hazard.
29The dynamic moral hazard models of DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006), DeMarzo and Fishman (2007), and
Biais, Mariotti, Plantin, and Rochet (2007) assume risk-neutrality, and so consumption smoothing is a non-issue.
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their ring decision. They nd qualitative support for these predictions, measuring hidden
pay with stock options, restricted stock, and annual pay not declared as salary and bonus. A
further potential avenue in this line of research would be a rent extraction model that generates
quantitative predictions, and allows for a horse-race between the two viewpoints.
Third, existing models of CEO pay are single-agent models, but CEOs work in teams where
complementarities between agents exist. As a result, their contracts a¤ect rm value not only
directly through a¤ecting the CEOs e¤ort, but also indirectly because the CEOs e¤ort level
a¤ects the optimal e¤ort level set chosen by workers. This consideration in turn a¤ects the
optimal contract for the CEO. Separately, a team setting allows the study of the relative wages
of the CEO and other employees, a question that has been of interest to regulators. Edmans,
Goldstein, and Zhu (2013) analyze these issues within a CEO setting; Chen and Yoo (2001),
Kremer (1993), Winter (2004, 2006, 2010), and Gervais and Goldstein (2007) are analyses of
contracting under production complementarities in general principal-agent settings.
Fourth, there has been substantial theoretical progress on continuous-time agency models
which allow for the contracting problem to be solved with few assumptions. However, the
empirical predictions of such models are typically less clear, given the absence of analytical
solutions, and because numerical solutions depend on the parameters chosen. Future research
may be able to identify clearer implications of these models, in particular comparative statics
on how incentives and turnover-performance sensitivity should di¤er across rms.
Fifth, contracting models assume that the principal and agent decide on the relevant perfor-
mance measures and a contract at the start of the employment relationship. However, there is
evidence that the performance measures may be renegotiated ex post (e.g. Morse, Nanda, and
Seru (2011)), and that more than half the CEOs of S&P 500 rms do not have an explicit em-
ployment contract, instead employing the CEO at-will (Gillan, Hartzell, and Parrino (2009)).
It would be interesting to study the optimal contract the CEO and rm wait until performance
has been realized before negotiating a sharing rule, and under what circumstances an implicit
contract can be sustained.
Sixth, with few exceptions, existing executive compensation models are rational. Incorpo-
rating behavioral considerations has been successful in other elds of corporate nance (see the
survey of Baker and Wurgler (2012)) and could be similarly fruitful here. Baker and Wurgler
(2012) divide the behavioral corporate nance literature into two elds managers who are
irrational or have non-standard utility functions, and rational managers exploiting ine¢ cient
markets. As an example of the former, Dittmann, Maug, and Spalt (2010) show that incorpo-
rating loss aversion can explain the observed mix of stock and options, which standard utility
functions cannot. As an example of the latter, Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) show
that contracts that emphasize short-term performance may be a rational response to speculative
markets. Other potential behavioral phenomena that could be incorporated into compensation
models include bounded rationality, overcondence (overweighting private signals and under-
weighting public signals), and optimism (overestimating ones own managerial ability or rm
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quality).
Finally, turning to questions for both theoretical and empirical research, we now have quan-
titative theories for the level of pay and demandside, given the supply of talent. However,
we know relatively little on the supplyside. Given the substantial pay premium that top ex-
ecutives command over other skilled professions (e.g. medicine or law), it would be interesting
to study empirically the extent to which this premium results from limited supply, and if so,
explore theoretically why supply appears to remain so limited why more people do not enter
the business profession. A related topic is to understand better the nature of the scarcity of
CEO talent, e.g. whether it stems from innate skills, experience, lack of succession planning,
and so on.30 Separately, while learning models (outside the scope of this survey and listed at
the end of the introduction) have generally been developed and tested independently of moral
hazard ones, theories that combine both learning and moral hazard, or empirical studies that
analyze the relative importance of learning versus moral hazard for observed contracts, would
be valuable.
6. Conclusion
This article has presented a number of shareholder value models of executive compensation
under a unifying framework. We commenced with assignment models of the CEO labor market.
More talented managers are matched with larger rms, since their talent is scalable. Their talent
also allows them to command higher wages, leading to quantitative predictions for the cross-
sectional relationship between pay and rm size. Since the dollar benets of talent are greater
in larger rms, the model also implies that pay should rise over time as average rm size grows.
We then moved to static moral hazard models, and showed that the correct empirical mea-
sure of incentives depends on whether we believe e¤ort has additive or multiplicative e¤ects on
rm value and CEO utility. Moreover, if the e¤ect of e¤ort scales with rm size, dollar-dollar
incentives should optimally be weaker in smaller rms. If e¤ort is continuous and the optimal
e¤ort level is interior and endogenous, as in Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987), incentives should
be increasing in the benets of e¤ort and decreasing in risk, risk aversion, and the cost of ef-
fort. In contrast, if e¤ort is binary, or continuous and the principal wishes to implement full
productive e¢ ciency, risk and risk aversion do not a¤ect incentives but increase the level of
pay. The rarity of relative performance evaluation appears to contradict the Holmstrom (1979)
informativeness principle, but we discussed potential rationalizations of this practice. If the
principal aims to induce risk-taking as well as e¤ort from the CEO, the contract should be con-
vex and generally contain options, in contrast to the linear contracts advocated by Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1987).
We nally discussed dynamic moral hazard models. To achieve optimal risk-sharing, the
30For the supply of skills of general workers, see Goldin and Katz (2011).
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reward for good performance should be smoothed over future periods. As the CEO approaches
retirement, since there are fewer periods over which to engage in smoothing, the sensitivity of
current pay to performance should rise. If the CEO can engage in private saving, his wage
prole is typically backward-loaded, to remove such saving incentives.
While each model has di¤erent features and tackles di¤erent questions, we highlight two
common themes. First, the modeling assumptions (e.g. whether preferences or production
functions are additive or multiplicative, whether actions are continuous or discrete, and whether
private saving is possible) can have signicant impact on the models predictions. Second, we
emphasize the empirical predictions of the models and compared them to the data. In particular,
observed practices that are often interpreted as evidence of rent extraction are also qualitatively,
and sometimes quantitatively, consistent with shareholder value. However, consistency with
observed correlations does not prove that real-life practices are optimal; instead, it merely
emphasizes caution before attempting to intervene by regulation. Whether observed contracts
result from e¢ ciency or rent extraction is still an open question, and we highlight other potential
avenues for future research. We look forward to seeing this literature continue to evolve.
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A. Longer Derivations
A.1. Proof of two core results on dynamic incentives
Heuristic proof of the Martingale representation theorem (72) We show two
proofs one rigorous, one heuristic that shows the economic origin of the result.
Heuristic proof. We reason by keeping the dt terms, dropping the O (dt2) terms.
Ut = Et
Z 1
t
e (s t)Ksds

= Et
Z t+dt
t
e (s t)Ksds

+ Et
Z 1
t+dt
e (s t)Ksds

= Ktdt+ o (dt) + e
 dtEt

Et+dt
Z 1
t+dt
e (s (t+dt))Ksds

= Ktdt+ o (dt) + e
 dtEtUt+dt
= Ktdt+ o (dt) + (1  dt) (Ut + EtdUt) + o (dt)
= Ut + (Kt   Ut) dt+ Et [dUt] + o (dt)
Hence,
0 = (Kt   Ut) dt+ Et [dUt] (80)
As dUt Et [dUt] has mean 0, and the only source of randomness is dZt,it makes sense that
it can be written
dUt   Et [dUt] = tdZt (81)
for some adapted process t. Combining this with (80), we obtain (72).
Rigorous proof. The following proof (after Sannikov 2008) is more rigorous, but a bit less
explicit about the origins of the result. Dene
V1 :=
Z 1
0
e sKsds
and Vt = Et [V1]. Then, Vt is a martingale. That implies that we can write dVt = te tdZt for
some adapted process t. Hence, Vt = V0 +
R t
0
se
 sdZs. On the other hand,
Vt = Et [V1] =
Z t
0
e sKsds+ Et
Z 1
t
e sKsds
=
Z t
0
e sKsds+ e tUt
as Ut = Et
R1
t
e (s t)Ksds. Di¤erentiating w.r.t. t, we obtain:
dVt = te
 tdZt = e tKtdt+ e tdUt   e tUtdt
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hence
dUt = (Ut  Kt) dt+ tdZt:

Heuristic proof of the Hamilton-Jacobi Bellman (HJB) equation (73). The
result is standard, but here we provide a heuristic proof. We rst ignore the maximization over
C. We have, as in (80),
0 = (f (xt; Ct)  Qt) dt+ Et [dQt]
Now, by Itos lemma using Qt = Q (xt), Et [dQt] =dt = Q0 (xt) (xt; C) + 12Q
00 (xt)2 (xt; C).
Hence,
0 = f (xt; Ct)  Q (xt) +Q0 (xt) (xt; Ct) + 1
2
Q00 (xt)2 (xt; Ct)
Next, the principal will want to maximize over Ct the right-hand side, hence (73). 
A.2. Proof of other results
Heuristic proof of (61)-(64) See Edmans, Gabaix, Sadzik, and Sannikov (2012) for a
rigorous proof. We present a heuristic proof in a simple case that conveys the key intuition. We
consider L = T = 2 and impose the PS constraint. We wish to show that the optimal contract
is given by
ln c1 = g
0 (a)
r1
2
+ 1; ln c2 = g
0 (a)
r1
2
+ r2

+ 1 + k2 (82)
for some constants 1 and k2 that make the participation constraint bind.
Step 1: Optimal log-linear contract
We rst solve the problem in a restricted class where contracts are log-linear, that is,
ln c1 = 1r1 + 1, ln c2 = 21r1 + 2r2 + 1 + k2 (83)
for some constants 1, 21; 2, 1; k2. This rst step is not necessary but claries the economics,
and in more complex cases is helpful to guess the form of the optimal contract.
First, intuitively, the optimal contract entails consumption smoothing, that is, shocks to
consumption are permanent. This observation implies 21 = 1. To prove this, the PS constraint
(64) yields
1 = E1

c1
c2

= e(1 21)r1E1

e 2r2 k2

: (84)
This must hold for all r1. Therefore, 21 = 1.
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Next, consider total utility U :
U = ln c1 + ln c2   g (a1)  g (a2)
= 21r1 + 2r2   g (a1)  g (a2) + 21 + k2:
From (58), the two EF conditions are E1
h
@U
@r1
i
 g0 (a) and E2
h
@U
@r2
i
 g0 (a), that is,
21  g0 (a) and 2  g0 (a) :
Intuitively (and as can be proven), the EF constraints should bind, else the CEO is exposed to
unnecessary risk. Combining the binding version of these constraints with (83) yields (82).
Step 2: Optimality of log-linear contracts
We next verify that optimal contracts should be log-linear. Equation (58) yields d (ln c2) =dr2 
g0 (a). The cheapest contract involves this local EF condition binding, that is,
d (ln c2) =dr2 = g
0 (a)  2: (85)
Integrating yields the contract
ln c2 = 2r2 +B (r1) ; (86)
where B (r1) is a function of r1, which we will determine shortly. It is the integration constant
of equation (85) viewed from time 2.
We next apply the PS constraint (64) for t = 1:
1 = E1

c1
c2

= E1
h c1
e2r2+B(r1)
i
= E1

e 2r2

c1e
 B(r1); (87)
Hence, we obtain
ln c1 = B (r1) +K
0; (88)
where the constant K 0 is independent of r1. (In this proof, K 0, K 00 and K 000 are constants
independent of r1 and r2.) Total utility is
U = ln c1 + ln c2 +K
00 = 2r2 + 2B(r1) + 2K 0 +K 00: (89)
We next apply (58) to (89) to yield 2B0 (r1)  g0 (a) : Again, the cheapest contract involves
this condition binding, that is, 2B0 (r1) = g0 (a) : Integrating yields
B (r1) = g
0 (a)
r1
2
+K 000: (90)
Combining (90) with (88) yields: ln c1 = g0 (a) r12 + 1, for another constant 1. Combining
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(90) with (86) yields:
ln c2 = g
0 (a)
r1
2
+ r2

+ 1 + k2;
for some constant k2.
Comparative statics for xed pay . We have
@
@
= K(3b
4S4   b2gwS2  2   2S+ 2g22S);
where
K =
b22S2
2 (b2S2 + g2)3
:
Hence, @

@
> 0 if and only if
3b4S4 + 2b2gS3 + 2g22S > b2gS22:
Further, we have
@
@
= K(3b
4S4   b2gS2  2   2S+ 2g22S);
where
K =
b2S2
(b2S2 + g2)3
:
Hence, @

@
> 0 if and only if
3b4S4 + 2b2gS3 + 2g22S > b2gS22:
We have
@
@g
= Kg(b
6S6 + 3b4g2S4   2b2g22S2  2   S+ 2g324S);
where
Kg =
b2S2
2g2 (b2S2 + g2)3
:
Hence, @

@g
> 0 if and only if
b6S6 + 3b4g2S4 + 2b2g22S3 + 2g324S > 2b2g22S22:
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B. Further Detail on Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987)
This section provides further details on the role played by exponential utility, a pecuniary
cost of e¤ort, and Normal noise in the Holmstrom and Milgrom (1987) model. In the general
objective function (10), we now assume u (x) = x so that the cost of e¤ort is non-pecuniary,
and have a general (rather than exponential) function v (). We assume the contract can be
rewritten c (V ) =  + z (V ) where  is the xed component of the contract and z (V ) is a
possibly non-linear function; this is without loss of generality since  can be zero. The agents
rst-order condition becomes
E [v0 (+ y (S + b (S) a+ ")) y0 (V ) b (S)] = g0 (a) :
The agents reservation utility w a¤ects the xed salary , which in turn has two e¤ects
on his e¤ort choice. First, it a¤ects his benet from e¤ort. A higher  reduces the marginal
utility of money v0 (+ z (V )) because the agent is risk averse. However, it does not a¤ect
the marginal cost of e¤ort, because e¤ort entails disutility rather than a nancial expenditure.
Thus, with a linear contract, the optimal action will depend on . Second, it a¤ects the agents
attitude towards risk ". The noise realization a¤ects the agents benet from e¤ort since he is
risk-averse. For example, if noise turns out to be high, then the agent will be highly-paid even
with low e¤ort; thus, the benets from working are lower: v0 () falls. Hence, the agent will
integrate over the possible noise realizations when making his e¤ort choice. Since  also lies
in the marginal felicity function v0 (), it a¤ects the agents attitude towards risk and thus his
e¤ort choice.
To remove the rst e¤ect, HM assume a pecuniary cost of e¤ort, which corresponds to
v (c) = c and a general u () in the objective function (10). Thus, the rst-order condition
becomes
E [u0 (+ z (S + b (S) a+ ")) (z0 (V ) b (S)  g0 (a))] = 0:
Now, the marginal benet of e¤ort z0 (V ) b (S) and the marginal cost of e¤ort g0 (a) are on
the same footing: both lie inside the nal term in parentheses. A high xed wage  reduces the
benet of e¤ort, but also the cost of e¤ort because this cost is in nancial terms. However,  still
a¤ects the attitude to risk since it is inside the u0 () term. Thus, to remove this second e¤ect,
we also need exponential utility, u (x) =  e x, so that the objective function (10) becomes
E
 e (+z(V ) g(a)) = e  E  e (z(V ) g(a))
with rst-order condition
E

e (z(S+b(S)a+") g(a)) (z0 (S + b (S) a+ ") b (S)  g0 (a)) = 0: (91)
The xed salary , and thus the reservation utility w, is now irrelevant. However, the contract
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is still very di¢ cult to solve as we cannot factor out the noise ". Again, since the incentive
constraint (91) must hold only on average, there are many possible contracts that will implement
a given action a. The contract will depend critically on the distribution of noise ", which poses
important practical challenges as the noise distribution is often unknown. Only with Normal
noise are we able to calculate the expectation, since then E [e "] = 1
2
22.
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